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DEFINITIONS 
Harasser – the perpetrator or defendant in the sexual harassment incident, who, by their 
conduct, creates unwelcome sexual advances and/or the alleged perpetrator or defendant in 
the sexual harassment incident. 
 
Harassed – the complainant, victim or recipient of the unwelcome sexual advances in the 
sexual harassment incident and/or the alleged complainant, victim or recipient in the sexual 
harassment incident.  
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ABSTRACT 
Sexual harassment is one of the most prominent forms of harassment encountered in the 
working world globally. This has resulted in a plethora of laws being enacted, whereby, the 
definition of sexual harassment was provided, and the legal remedies available to the harassed, 
were established. Of particular importance, regarding the laws, is the different definitions 
which provide the elements that need to be satisfied before the conduct of the harasser can 
constitute sexual harassment.  
 
The unwelcome element is apposite in almost all jurisdictions when defining sexual harassment 
which undoubtedly indicates the importance of the unwelcome element. However, this element 
is difficult to establish in practice, and there is judicial inconsistency as to whose perspective 
the conduct should be considered unwelcome from, namely that of the harasser or harassed. 
Furthermore, studies indicate that men are more likely to find sexual connotations in the 
responses of women, yet women often use less confrontational responses to show that the 
conduct was unwelcome.  
 
The above simply adds to the difficulties in the determination of the unwelcome element which 
is further fueled by the underdeveloped literature in South Africa on this element. Therefore, 
this dissertation endeavours to make a contribution to the limited knowledge in the area of 
sexual harassment by critically analysing and deconstructing the unwelcome element.  
 
Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is achieved through a legal comparative study to 
American jurisprudence, whereby the scholar, Joan Weiner, identified factors that the US 
courts consider in the determination of whether the conduct of the harasser was unwelcome. 
The relevance of these factors, in the determination of the unwelcome element, were compared 
and contrasted to South African case law. 
 
The findings from the analysis conducted revealed that even though these factors are seen by 
courts as an attempt to ensure that liability without fault is not attributed to the harasser, 
especially where sexual harassment is dealt with as a misconduct, the unwelcome element 
essentially acts as a roadblock to the harassed in sexual harassment cases. This element is used 
by harassers, as a defence, to show that the harassed’s conduct if scrutinised closely, indicates 
that she was welcoming of the conduct of the harasser resulting, in courts analysing the conduct 
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of the harassed for signals to establish the unwelcome element. The main implication is that 
the harassed is placed on trial detracting from the behaviour of the harasser in sexual 
harassment cases.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Harassment takes different forms in the workplace; it can be sexual, racial, pregnancy-related 
harassment and workplace bullying.1 However, sexual harassment is one of the most prevalent 
forms of harassment encountered in the working world.2 It is also considered one of the most 
controversial issues in the workplace.3  
 
Sexual harassment is a significant problem affecting the workplace globally, of which the 
South African labour market is no exception.4 According to Frances Beasley, a 1990 survey 
was conducted which indicated that 76% of South African women in their career path have 
been subjected to some form of sexual harassment, yet would rather resign instead of reporting 
the incident.5 It is well recognised that women are subjected to sexual harassment more so than 
their male counterparts.6  
 
Therefore, reference is often made to the harassed in the feminine gender, whilst the harasser 
is referred to in the masculine gender.7 These references do not wish to depict sexist views, but 
rather a depiction of reality.8 However, it must be noted that courts have set precedents 
providing that men may also be sexually harassed at work and that such harassment can occur 
between persons of the same sex.9 
 
According to Mowatt, when a women’s sex role or gender receives more attention at work 
from men, it leads to sexual harassment.10 In a limited manner, when a female is forced to 
participate in sexual activities to remain employed or obtain some benefit, sexual harassment 
                                                          
1 R le Roux, T Orleyn, A Rycroft  Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Laws, policies and processes (2005) 1. 
2 S Gaibie ‘Employment Equity and Anti-Discrimination Law: The Employment Equity Act 12 Years on’ (2011) 
32 ILJ 41.  
3 Note 1 above, 1. 
4 A Basson ‘Sexual harassment in the workplace: an overview of developments’ (2007) 18(3) Stell LR 425.  
5 P Halfkenny ‘Legal and Workplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa (Part 2): The South African 
Experience’ (1996) 17 ILJ 214.  
6 N Hadjifotiou Women and Harassment at Work (1983) 23. 
7 C Wood ‘Inviting Sexual Harassment: The Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment 
Law’ (2000) 39 Brandeis L.J 423. 
8 Ibid. 
9 J Pretorius, M Klinck & C Ngwena Employment Equity Law (2016) 6-29. 
10 J G Mowatt ‘Sexual Harassment – New Remedy for Old Wrong’ (1987) 7 ILJ 638. 
 2 
 
exists.11 Broadly speaking, sexual harassment results from any unwanted sexual advances made 
toward the victim which has a negative effect.12 
 
The above was relied upon by the Industrial Court in J v M,13 South Africa’s (SA) first sexual 
harassment case, which defined sexual harassment broadly: 
“…[I]n its narrowest form sexual harassment occurs when a woman (or a man) is 
expected to engage in sexual activity in order to obtain or keep employment or obtain 
promotion or other favourable working conditions. In its wider view it is, however, any 
unwanted sexual behaviour or comment which has a negative effect on the recipient. 
Conduct which can constitute sexual harassment ranges from innuendo, inappropriate 
gestures, suggestions or hints or fondling without consent or by force to its worst form, 
namely, rape. It is 'in my opinion also not necessary that the conduct must be repeated. 
A single act can constitute sexual harassment.”14 
 
Sexual harassment is a stress contributor in the workplace, which could lead to depression, 
anxiety, and a decline in job performance.15 This form of harassment also impacts upon the 
victim’s, particularly women’s, advancement in the workplace.16 The latter arises as victims of 
sexual harassment either take days off from work, transfer or leave the job all together which 
has a detrimental effect on long-term prospects of success at work.17 Further, the effect of 
sexual harassment on the victim could result in a violation of certain rights, such as the right to 
dignity,18 equality,19 privacy,20 and freedom of bodily integrity.21  
 
From the above, it becomes evident that laws combating sexual harassment in the workplace 
are essential. The legal framework addressing sexual harassment has local and international 
influences. Internationally, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13J v M (1989) 10 ILJ 755. Hereinafter referred to as J v M.  
14 Ibid 757F. 
15 Note 6 above, 20. 
16 Note 10 above, 652. 
17 Note 6 above, 21. 
18 Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution).  
19 Section 9 of the Constitution. 
20 Section 14 of the Constitution. 
21 Section 12 of the Constitution.  
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Against Women (CEDAW) regards sexual harassment as a form of violence against women.22 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Convention and Recommendations further notes that even though sexual harassment is not 
expressly mentioned in Convention 11 of 1958, it is a form of sex discrimination.23 Locally, 
section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and gender and sets 
the model for legislation which prohibits discrimination.24  The above have paved the way for 
SA’s labour laws in respect of gender inequality and related aspects of sexual harassment.25 
 
Section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act26 (EEA) provides that harassment on any one of 
the listed grounds, which includes sex, is a “form of unfair discrimination”.27 The Labour 
Relations Act28 (LRA) also prohibits discrimination in terms of section 187(1)(f). The Code of 
Good Practice on Handling Sexual Harassment Cases, 1998 (1998 Code) was attached to the 
LRA, and the Code of Good Practice on Handling Sexual Harassment Cases, 2005 (2005 Code) 
is attached to the EEA. 
 
It must be highlighted that as of 19 December 2018, the Minister of Labour issued a notice 
formally repealing the 1998 Code. The effect of the repeal is that, moving forward, the 2005 
Code should only be relied upon in relation to sexual harassment incidents in the workplace. 
 
Notwithstanding the repeal, the 1998 Code will still be referred to and/or analysed throughout 
this study. The reason for this is due to the fact that the 1998 Code reflects the legislatures first 
attempt at setting guidelines in relation to incidents of sexual harassment in the South African 
working environment. Therefore, reference and/or discussion on the repealed Code aims to 
depict a holistic understanding of the history on the handling of sexual harassment incidents in 
the workplace. Furthermore, the jurisprudence on sexual harassment provided through case law 
refer to the 1998 Code and the findings of the cases are based on the enforcement of both Codes 
being in play. Lastly in relation to the objective of this study both Codes entrench and therefore 
                                                          
22 F Banda ‘Building on a global movement: Violence against women in the African context’ (2008) 8(1) AHRLJ 
11. 
23 A Botes ‘Identifying Sexual Harassment in the Workplace? Do Not Forget to Remember the Code of Good 
Practice’ (2015) 36 ILJ 1722. 
24 Note 2 above, 22. 
25 Note 1 above, 12. 
26 55 of 1998. 
27 Note 2 above, 26. 
28 66 of 1995. 
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confirm the importance of the unwanted or unwelcome element as a prerequisite for 
determination of sexual harassment in the workplace. 
 
From the above the importance of the inclusivity of the 1998 Code in this study must yet again 
be noted. However, all references to the 1998 Code should not be construed or understood to 
mean that the 1998 Code is still in effect and as such applied.  
 
Therefore, both Codes are still important, as they provide key elements that need to be 
established in sexual harassment cases,29 clarify the conduct that establishes sexual harassment 
and provides guidance to employers on accounting for sexual harassment in the workplace.30  
 
In both the 1998 and 2005 Codes, it states that the conduct, which is of a sexual nature, must 
be unwelcome/unwanted by the victim. This is important, as a distinction is drawn between 
mutual and wanted sexual advances by consenting adults in the workplace.31 
 
Therefore, it becomes apparent that the unwelcome element lies at the centre of importance in 
the determination of sexual harassment.32 However, this particular element in sexual 
harassment cases has presented difficulties in practice.33 The difficulties are presented by the 
test for the determination of sexual harassment, particularly when considering from whose 
perspective the conduct of the harasser is regarded as unwelcome, namely, whether it is 
subjective, from the harassed’s point of view, or objective from the harasser’s point of view.34 
 
Further, the enquiry into the unwelcome element presents difficulty in practice, as the court’s 
attention is focused on the victim for signs of whether he or she welcomed the conduct of the 
harasser, as opposed to the court’s assessment of the harasser’s conduct to determine if it was 
welcomed.35  
 
 
                                                          
29 Note 23 above, 1719. 
30 Ibid 1723. 
31 Ibid 1725. 
32 L Fitzgerald ‘Legal and Psychological Constructions of Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment’ in C 
Mackinnon & R Siegal Directions in Sexual Harassment Law (2004) 103. 
33 Note 4 above, 430. 
34 Ibid 432.  
35 Note 32 above, 95. 
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1.2 Statement of Purpose  
The objective of this dissertation is to critically analyse the unwelcome element which is one 
of the prominent elements necessary for the establishment of sexual harassment, with particular 
reference to American jurisprudence and the South African judicial interpretation thereof.  
 
1.3 Rationale  
Sexual harassment is considered to be a controversial issue in the workplace because what 
constitutes sexual harassment differs between persons.36 This essentially stems from the fact 
that in the eyes of the harassed, the conduct of the alleged harasser may be unwelcome and 
offensive, yet from the viewpoint of the alleged harasser, his or her conduct may seem 
welcomed.37 The latter links to an interesting study that was conducted which indicated that 
men are less likely to identify sexual conduct as sexual harassment when compared to women.38  
 
Therefore, even though the unwelcome element has proved to be problematic,39 its importance 
cannot be understated due to the fact that in almost all jurisdictions the unwelcome element is 
a prerequisite for the determination of sexual harassment.40 It is for this reason that the aim of 
this dissertation is to critically define and explore the unwelcome element in order to consider 
what was relied upon to negate this element and in doing such, extract, from case law, what 
factors the courts include or exclude in making a determination as to whether the conduct of 
the harasser was unwelcome by the harassed.  
 
It goes without saying that human interaction in the workplace is inevitable and it is likely that 
workplace romances could occur between employees.41 Moreover, it is well established that 
the unwelcome element distinguishes behaviour which is mutual and welcomed between 
consenting adults in the workplace.42 Therefore, this dissertation will consider the extent to 
which a consensual office relationship negates the unwelcome element. 
 
 
                                                          
36 Note 1 above, 1. 
37 Note 32 above, 96. 
38 Note 5 above, 216.  
39 Note 4 above, 430. 
40 C Cooper ‘Harassment on the basis of Sex and Gender: A form of Unfair Discrimination’ (2002) 23 ILJ 10. 
41 C Sanger ‘Consensual Sex and the Limits of Harassment Law’ in C Mackinnon & R Siegal Directions in Sexual 
Harassment Law (2004) 78.  
42 Note 23 above, 1725. 
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1.4 Research Questions 
This paper seeks to address the following research questions: 
1.4.1 What is the legal framework addressing sexual harassment in the workplace, a local 
and international analysis? 
1.4.2 What is the unwelcome element in sexual harassment matters? 
1.4.3 What factors do courts consider when determining whether the conduct of the harasser 
was unwelcome? 
1.4.4 Does an office romance negate the unwelcome element? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
The main approach that will be employed in this dissertation is desktop research. The desktop 
research approach will require an extensive reliance upon both primary and secondary sources 
including case law, legislation, the Codes, journal articles, as well as textbooks.  
 
1.6 Theoretical Framework 
Since this dissertation undertakes to assess the law relative to sexual harassment in the 
workplace, with particular emphasis on the unwelcome element, which will frequently include 
a critical analysis on law reports, as well as legislation, the theory of positivism is the main 
theoretical framework of choice. Positivism rejects natural law.43 This was prominently made 
known by one of the earliest positivist theorists, Jeremy Bentham.44 He believed that the law 
should be described as it is by considering judgments and decisions of the legislative branch, 
and not merely as it ought to be.45  
 
1.7 Research Outline  
The structure of this dissertation will consist of 5 chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 includes the background and the research questions. A literature review is not 
considered separately here, as the literature on sexual harassment is addressed throughout the 
following chapters. 
 
                                                          
43 D Johnson, S Pete & M du Plessis… et al Jurisprudence A south African perspective (2005) 65.  
44 Ibid 66. 
45 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2 assesses the law in relation to sexual harassment, internationally and locally, with an 
emphasis on the definition of sexual harassment and the remedies available to the harassed.  
 
Chapter 3 critically analyses and defines the unwelcome element, with particular reference to 
the United States of America (USA/US) model, the test for sexual harassment and the problems 
associated with the unwelcome element.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the judicial interpretation of the unwelcome element in order to identify 
the factors used by courts to determine whether the conduct of the harasser was unwelcome. 
Further, the chapter will also assess whether an office romance is considered such a factor in 
order to negate the unwelcome element.  
 
Chapter 5 provides recommendations to the problems identified in each of the aforementioned 
chapters and the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ADDRESSING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a discussion of the legal framework addressing sexual harassment will ensue. 
Sexual harassment from an international perspective will be considered. Further, the 
constitutional impact in relation to sexual harassment, as well as the model it sets for the 
development of further legislation on the issue, will be explored. Thereafter, general laws on 
sexual harassment broadly, not necessarily labour-specific, will be analysed with particular 
emphasis on defining sexual harassment and the legal remedies available to the harassed in 
terms of the legislation and the common law. Finally, the labour laws that are designed to 
eliminate sexual harassment in the workplace will be examined, with particular reference to 
both the 1998 and 2005 Codes.  
 
2.2 International Instruments  
South Africa has undertaken certain international legal obligations by becoming a member state 
to various conventions, specifically from 1994 onwards.46 Many of these international 
approaches were enacted with the aim of the promotion and protection of women, and thus, the 
furtherance of gender equality.47 These international instruments either approach sexual 
harassment from a gender-based violence aspect or from an anti-discrimination model.48 Thus, 
two international models will be discussed in relation to their role in the development of sexual 
harassment. 
 
2.2.1 CEDAW 
In 1979, CEDAW was adopted which provides protection to women against discrimination, 
both inside and outside the workplace.49 CEDAW is unique, as discrimination on the basis of 
                                                          
46 M O’ Sullivan and C Murray ‘Brooms sweeping oceans? Women’s rights in South Africa’s first decade of 
democracy’ 2005 Acta Juridica 2. 
47 Ibid 2. 
48 G Ore-Aguilar ‘Sexual Harassment and Human Rights in Latin America’ (1997) 66(2) Fordham L. Rev 638.  
49 Ibid 639.  
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sex and gender was not simply prohibited,50 rather article 2 prohibits discrimination in all forms 
directed towards women specifically.51 SA ratified it in December 1995.52  
 
CEDAW’s aim is to extend socio-economic rights to women through the promotion of gender 
equality.53 Article 11.1 of CEDAW obliges member states to “take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment.”54 Due to this article, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the committee) adopted 
General Recommendation No. 19.55  
 
Recommendation No. 19 provides a definition of sexual harassment.56 It must be noted that 
general recommendations are not binding laws on member states.57  However, section 232 of 
the South African Constitution makes it clear that “customary international law is law in South 
Africa unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or legislation.”58  
 
Two requirements need to be satisfied for the establishment of customary international law; 
firstly, there must be an established practice, meaning that there must be a “constant and 
uniform usage”59 or the rule must have a general acceptance which is not necessarily 
universal.60 Secondly, the state must feel as if there is an obligation to be bound by the rule.61 
Therefore, even though recommendations do not impose an express mandate on SA, they are 
still important pieces of customary international law, as it would seem that these requirements 
lend support to the fact that by the country becoming a member state to CEDAW, SA has a 
general acceptance of the recommendations provided by the committees and a sense that there 
is an obligation to be bound by the recommendations.62 This is applicable to the ILO 
recommendations below as well.  
                                                          
50 S Fredman ‘Engendering socio-economic rights’ (2009) 25(3) SAJHR 435. 
51 C Beninger ‘Combating sexual violence in schools in sub-Saharan Africa: Legal strategies under regional and 
international human rights law’ (2013) 13(2) AHRLJ 288. 
52‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women’ available at 
http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/treaties/discrim.htm, accessed on 10 June 2018. 
53 Note 50 above, 434 and 435. 
54J Aeberhard-Hodges ‘Sexual harassment in employment: Recent judicial and arbitral trends’ (1996) 135(5) 
International Labour Review 505.  
55 Ibid.   
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Note 1 above, 27.  
59 Asylum case 1950 ICJ Reports 266.  
60 J Dugard International Law A South African Perspective 4 ed (2015) 26, 28, 29, 52 and 53.  
61 Ibid 29.  
62 See Note 1 above, 27. 
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Thus, General Recommendation No. 19 63 provides that sexual harassment at work can be 
regarded as a type of gender violence directed towards women that impairs women’s 
employment equality.64 Sexual harassment is defined as: 
“Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour as physical 
contact and advances, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography and sexual demands, 
whether by words or actions. Such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and 
safety problem; it is discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her 
objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment, including recruiting or 
promotion, or when it creates a hostile working environment.”65 
 
General Recommendation No.19 requires that member states construct measures, such as the 
submission of reports, to ensure the protection of women in employment against gender-based 
violence such as sexual harassment.66  
 
2.2.2 ILO 
The second international model that will be considered is the ILO, with reference to its 
conventions and recommendations. This is one of the specialised agencies in terms of the 
United Nations, which has been at the forefront of combating discriminatory practices against 
women.67 SA became a member state of the ILO in 1919, with its first convention ratified in 
1921 and has since ratified over 20 conventions.68 One of the main conventions of the ILO 
addressing discrimination of women in the workplace is the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention 111 of 195869 which SA ratified on the 5 March 1997.70 
 
This Convention, like CEDAW, makes no reference to sexual harassment directly.71 However, 
the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
                                                          
63 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women, 1992, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html, accessed 17 June 2018 . 
64 Paragraph 17 of General Recommendation No. 19. See Note 54 above, 506.  
65 Note 54 above, 506. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid 507.  
68‘SA’s ratification of ILO conventions’ available at https://www.gilesfiles.co.za/ratification-of-ilo-conventions-
south-africa-a-good-performer-john-brand/, accessed on 11 June 2018. 
69 Note 54 above, 507.  
70 Note 68 above. 
71 Note 23 above, 1722.  
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remedied this silence.72 The Committee of Experts’ General Survey73 of the Convention No.19 
included various examples of sexual harassment, such as physical contact, gestures and looks 
of a sexual nature, insults, and inappropriate statements regarding a person’s physique, dress 
and age.74  
 
Moreover, the Committee of Experts in the General Survey highlighted two conditions that 
need to be satisfied to constitute sexual harassment. Firstly, the harassed employee must regard 
the conduct of the harasser as a continued case at work.75 Secondly, the conduct of a sexual 
nature must affect the harassed employee’s decision-making ability, impact on the employee’s 
work performance, or humiliate or injure the dignity of the harassed.76 
 
Furthermore, the ILO Committee’s Special Survey77 on the application of Convention 111 of 
1958 provided a comprehensive definition of sexual harassment: 
“Any insult or inappropriate remark, joke, insinuation and comments on a person's dress, 
physique, age, family situation, etc.; a condescending or paternalistic attitude with sexual 
implications undermining dignity; any unwelcome invitation or request, implicit or explicit, 
whether or not accompanied by threats; any lascivious look or gesture associated with sexuality; 
and any unnecessary physical contact such as touching, caresses, pinching or assault.”78 
 
2.3 The SA Constitution  
Even though these two international bodies seek to address sexual harassment, few courts make 
reference to these international standards in case law.79 Therefore, an analysis of the 
Constitution as it relates to sexual harassment through various provisions will ensue. There is 
a link between the Constitution and international law, explained above, which is evident from 
section 39(1) of the Constitution, which states that courts “must consider international law” 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights.80  
                                                          
72 Note 54 above, 507. 
73 ILO: Equality in employment and occupation, General Survey by the Committee of Experts on the Application 
of Conventions and Recommendations, International Labour Conference, 75th Session, 1988. Report III (Part 4B), 
Geneva, 1988, paras. 45 and 46. See Note 54 above, 507.  
74 Note 54 above, 507. 
75 Note 48 above, 637. 
76 Ibid.  
77 ILO 'Equality in Employment and Occupation: Special Survey on Equality in Employment and Occupation in 
respect of Convention No. 111' (Geneva 1996) 15. 
78 Note 23 above, 1723.  
79 Note 54 above, 504.  
80 Note 1 above, 27.  
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Throughout the Constitution, sexual harassment is not stated.81 However, the right that would 
be dominant in the context of sexual harassment is the right to equality upheld in section 9 of 
the Constitution. More specifically, section 9(4) provides for the right to not “unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly” on a number of grounds, such as: 
“race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”82 
 
Section 23(1) provides that “everyone has the right to fair labour practices.” It has been 
established that sexual harassment is an unfair labour practice.83 Therefore, an extension can 
be made that employers have a constitutional responsibility of prohibiting the occurrence of 
sexual harassment at work.84 
 
Thus, the right to both equality and to fair labour practices, entrenched in the constitution, have 
set a mould for other legislation designed to address sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Section 6(3) of the EEA has linked the grounds listed in section 9(3) of the Constitution to 
sexual harassment by confirming that harassment is unfair discrimination if it is based on 
grounds listed in subsection (1) inclusive of sex and gender.85 The grounds in section 6(1) of 
the EEA86 mimic the grounds in section 9(3) of the Constitution.  
 
Further, PEPUDA also reinforces the right to equality; however, unlike the EEA which applies 
to cases of unfair discrimination in the workplace, PEPUDA applies to cases of discrimination 
which occur outside the workplace.87 Both the EEA and PEPUDA will be analysed in greater 
detail in relation to sexual harassment below.  
 
                                                          
81 A Mukheibir & L Ristow ‘An overview of sexual harassment: liability of the employer’ (2006) 27(2) Obiter 
253.  
82 Section 9(3) of the Constitution.  
83 E Snyman Van-Deventer & J De Bruin ‘Sexual harassment in South African and American law’ (2002) 1 Acta 
Academia 211. 
84Ibid.  
85 Note 81 above, 253.  
86 Section 6 of the EEA states that “No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an 
employee… on one or more of the grounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, languae, birth or any other arbitrary ground.” 
87 Note 81 above, 253.  
 13 
 
There are other constitutionally entrenched rights, such as the right to dignity88 and the right to 
privacy89 in the Constitution that are relevant in the context of sexual harassment.90 This was 
highlighted in Reddy v University of Natal91 when the LAC held that “…in terms of the 
Constitution, sexual harassment infringes the right to human dignity … and the right to privacy 
enshrined in s 14.”92  
 
An infringement of dignity is determined when a person subjectively feels that his or her self-
worth and pride are violated.93 Contumelia, feelings of humiliation, is an essential requirement 
when determining the factual violation of dignity.94 Thus, there is a correlation between the 
right to dignity and sexual harassment, as case law has confirmed that sexual harassment is 
humiliating and demeaning for the harassed.95  
 
Privacy refers to the most intimate part of an individual’s life and protects a person from 
interferences and intrusions.96 It must be noted that an invasion of privacy has been taken as a 
standalone offence without constituting sexual harassment.97 However, it would seem that one 
can easily establish the link between the right to privacy and sexual harassment, especially in 
cases involving a physical touch which would certainly invade the harassed’s personal space 
and violate their right to privacy. However, these rights are usually regulated by the common 
law, specifically the law of delict, which will be discussed further below.98 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution is given effect to, by section 186(2) of the LRA, which notes 
that unfair labour practices should be prohibited.99 As stated above, sexual harassment 
constitutes an unfair labour practice.100 Further, section 186(2)(b) of the LRA states that an 
unfair labour practice may be defined as “the unfair suspension of an employee or any other 
                                                          
88 Section 10 of the Constitution.  
89 Section 14 of the Constitution.  
90 Note 1 above, 16. 
91 Reddy v University of Natal (1998) 19 ILJ 49 (LAC). 
92 Ibid 52H. 
93 M Loubser… et al The Law of Delict In South Africa 2 ed (2013) 321.  
94 Ibid 321 and 326.  
95 See Note 13 above, 757J-758A.  
96 Note 93 above, 326. 
97 See Mokoena & another v Garden Art (Pty) Ltd & another (2008) 29 ILJ 1196 (LC).  See also Moatshe v 
Legend Golf & Safari Resort Operations (Pty) Ltd (2015) 36 ILJ 1111 (LC).  
98 Note 1 above, 16.  
99 N Smit & D Van Der Nest ‘When sisters are doing it for themselves: Sexual harassment claims in the workplace’ 
(2004) (3) TSAR 537.  
100 Note 83 above, 211. 
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disciplinary action of an employee short of dismissal...”101 Therefore, if an employee, namely 
an alleged harasser, can establish that they have been unfairly suspended or unfair disciplinary 
action has been instituted, for alleged sexual harassment, such employee may be able to claim 
an unfair labour practice in terms of the LRA.102  
 
Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA regulates the automatic unfair dismissal of an employee if an 
employer unfairly discriminated against an employee on grounds not limited to “race, gender, 
sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility.”103 This 
correlates to the grounds set out in section 9(3). 
 
Therefore, if an employee is dismissed for failing to accept unwelcome sexual advances the 
dismissal could be deemed automatically unfair.  
 
2.4 General Laws 
As can be seen above, the Constitution and international models have set the path for legislation 
to the enacted,104 whereby, legislation is either specifically designed to proclaim sexual 
harassment as a prohibited act in the working environment or general legislation regulating sex 
discrimination in which remedies for sexual harassment are extracted.105 The former will be 
covered further below when analysing labour laws enacted to combat sexual harassment in the 
workplace. The latter will be assessed directly below, such as general laws including national 
legislation enacted to address sexual harassment, not necessarily in a workplace setting, and 
the common law which could be relied upon by the harassed employee for legal remedies 
against sexual harassment.   
 
2.4.1 Health and Safety Legislation  
2.4.1.1 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act  
A consideration of whether a victim, who has been sexually harassed and as a result, suffers 
harm psychologically, can claim from the employer in terms of Compensation for Occupational 
                                                          
101 Note 81 above, 254. 
102 Note 1 above, 24.  
103 Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA.  
104 Note 46 above, 2. 
105 Note 54 above, 501.  
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Injuries and Diseases Act106 (COIDA) will be discussed under general laws. In assessing 
COIDA’s applicability in the context of sexual harassment, the defence raised by the employer 
in Ntsabo v Real Security CC107 and Grobler v Nasper Bpk108 will be considered.  
 
In the Grobler case, the defence raised by Nasper (the employer) was that even if it was 
accepted that Nasper was liable for the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), then Grobler 
(the harassed employee) should have claimed damages in terms of COIDA as section 35109 and 
36110 of COIDA barred an employer from being sued as a result of accidents or injuries suffered 
at work.111 Despite the expert medical evidence of injury to the mind of the employee,112 the 
court was not convinced that sexual harassment may be such an “accident” as required by 
COIDA.113 Secondly, the fact the employee had resigned meant she was no longer an 
employee, and thus, the employer could not enjoy the protection afforded by COIDA.114 Even 
though the case was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal,115 it was held that the 
court a quo’s jurisdiction was not precluded by COIDA.116 However, Farlam JA noted:  
“It may well be that employees who contract psychiatric disorders as a result of acts of sexual 
harassment to which they are subjected in the course of their employment can claim 
compensation under s 65...”117 
 
                                                          
106 130 of 1993. 
107Ntsabo v Real Security CC (2003) 24 ILJ 2341 (LC). Hereinafter referred to as the Ntsabo case or Ntsabo. 
108Grobler v Nasper Bpk (2004) 23 ILJ 439 (C). Hereinafter referred to as the Grobler case or Grobler.   
109 Section 35(1) of COIDA states that “No action shall lie by an employee or any dependant of an employee for 
the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational injury or disease resulting in the disablement or death of 
such employee against such employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer 
shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death.” 
110 Section 36(1)(a) of COIDA states that “If an occupational injury or disease in respect of which compensation 
is payable, was caused in circumstances resulting in some person other than the employer of the employee 
concerned (in this section referred to as the 'third party') being liable for damages in respect of such injury or 
disease  the employee may claim compensation in terms of this Act and may also institute action for damages in 
a court of law against the third party.” 
111 B Whitcher ‘Two Roads to an Employer’s Vicarious Liability for Sexual Hrassment: S Grobler v Naspers Bpk 
en ‘N Ander and Ntsabo v Real Security’ (2004) 25 ILJ 1920.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Note 1 above, 25.  
114 Note 111 above, 1920.  
115Media 24 Ltd & another v Grobler 2005 (6) SA 328 (SCA); (2005) 26 ILJ 1007 (SCA).  
116 Ibid 1027 para 74.  
117 Ibid 1028 para 77.  
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Therefore, some argue that this was a significant statement made by the SCA in that the court 
did not preclude the harassed employee from bringing a claim in terms of section 65118 of 
COIDA if the sexual harassment incident fell within the course and scope of employment.119 
 
In the Ntsabo case, a similar defence was raised by the employer as in the Grobler case, namely 
that the employee who suffered from PTSD should have claimed in terms of Section 16120 of 
COIDA.121 The Labour Court (LC) held that sexual harassment falls outside the job description 
of the supervisor and the applicant.122 Thus, it was concluded that since COIDA was enacted 
for injuries that fell within the realm of employment, an incident of sexual harassment fell 
outside this realm, and thus, COIDA was not applicable.123  
 
It must be noted that there has been no reported case of a successful claim brought in terms of 
COIDA for a psychological injury caused by sexual harassment.124 Therefore, even though 
there may be a linkage between health and safety legislation and sexual harassment, COIDA is 
not often relied upon, and thus, other laws will be considered below. 
 
2.4.2 PEPUDA  
It was established when looking at the constitutional provisions above that PEPUDA, and the 
EEA were enacted to give effect to the fundamental right of equality.125 Section 11 of PEPUDA 
expressly prohibits harassment.126 In relation to sexual harassment, PEPUDA will only be 
                                                          
118 Section 65(1)(a) and (b) of COIDA states that “Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, an employee shall be 
entitled to the compensation provided for and prescribed in this Act if it is proved to the satisfaction of the 
Director-General- 
(a) that the employee has contracted a disease mentioned in the first column of Schedule 3 and that such disease 
has arisen out of and in the course of his or her employment; or 
(b) that the employee has contracted a disease other than a disease contemplated in paragraph (a) and that such 
disease has arisen out of and in the course of his or her employment.” 
119 K Malherbe ‘The expediency of including claims based on disablement caused by sexual harassment in South 
Africa's system of workers' compensation’ (2016) 27(3) Stell LR 477.  
120 Section 16(1)(a) of COIDA states that “The compensation fund shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be 
under the control of the Director-General and its moneys shall be applied by the Director-General to- 
(a) the payment of compensation, the cost of medical aid or other pecuniary benefits to or on behalf of or in 
respect of employees in terms of this Act where no other person is liable for such payment.” 
121 Note 111 above, 1922.  
122 Ibid. See also Note 107 above, 2380C-D. 
123 Note 1 above, 25.  
124 Note 119 above, 482.  
125 Note 81 above, 253.  
126 Section 11 of PEPUDA states that “No person may subject any person to harassment.” See Note 81 above, 
253.  
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applicable in cases where the EEA does not apply.127 Therefore, PEPUDA is limited in relation 
to harassment in the workplace.128  
 
With the latter said, those who were subjected to harassment, such as learners, clients, 
independent contractors and suppliers, by a subsequent employee, will not be able to bring a 
claim for sexual harassment in terms of the EEA, as they themselves are not regarded as 
“employees” in terms of the latter act.129 Thus, these “non-employees” would have to rely on 
the provisions in PEPUDA in support of their sexual harassment claim. 
 
Further, members of “the National Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency, the South 
African Secret Services”130 inter alia are also not regarded as employees, and thus, it seems 
that if an incident of sexual harassment were to occur in that workplace setting, the claim would 
need to be challenged in terms of PEPUDA.131 
 
PEPUDA differs from the EEA in that it does not confine harassment to the scope of unfair 
discrimination.132 PEPUDA also differs from the EEA, as the former act provides a 
comprehensive definition of sexual harassment in section 1(1).133 Harassment is defined in 
PEPUDA as: 
“harassment means unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates 
or creates a hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce submission by actual 
or threatened adverse consequences and which is related to-  
(a) sex, gender or sexual orientation, or 
(b) a person’s membership or presumed membership of a group identified by one or 
more of the prohibited groups or a characteristic associated with such group.” 
 
                                                          
127 Note 99 above, 520. See Section 5(3) of the PEPUPA which states that “[t]his Act does not apply to any person 
to whom and to the extent to which the Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act 55 of 1998), applies.” 
128 Note 1 above, 20.  
129 O Dupper… et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law (2004) 23. See Note 1 above, 20. 
130 Section 4(3) of the EEA.   
131 Note 129 above, 24. 
132 Note 81 above, 255. See Section 15 of PEPUDA, where it states that “harassment not subject to the 
determination of fairness” in terms of section 14. 
133Note 81 above, 225. 
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Therefore, in the context of the sexual harassment grounds of sex, gender or sexual orientation 
would be relevant.134 PEPUDA applies to harassment in other sectors such as education, 
housing, health care.135 Thus, it will become apparent that PEPUDA will not be as relevant to 
sexual harassment in the workplace where such conduct occurs between “employees”, since 
the EEA, discussed further below, is the leading legislative authority in this regard.136 It goes 
without saying that laws which do not preclude persons who are covered by the EEA would 
need to be considered in the context of sexual harassment, an example of the latter is the 
Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (PHA).137 
 
2.4.3 PHA 
The preamble of the PHA expressly states that certain fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution, such as “the right to equality, the right to privacy, the right to dignity [and] the 
right to freedom and security of the person” are linked to the right to be free from violence.138 
Sexual harassment, as a form of gender-based violence, has been established internationally. 
The main objective of PHA is to “afford victims of harassment an effective remedy against 
such behaviour”.139 This remedy is a protection order.  
 
Section 1(1) provides that PHA is applicable to “any person who alleges that he or she is being 
subjected to harassment”.140 Further, PHA provides that the complainants of harassment may 
be subjected to abuse via social media like Facebook, electronic communication, stalking and 
sexual harassment.141 It is important to note that the PHA is not limited to harassment within 
the workplace and unlike PEPUDA,  the provisions of PHA do not prevent people who can 
also apply in terms of the EEA, from making an application for a protection order.142  
 
                                                          
134 M McGregor ‘“Do You Want a Lover Tonight?” Does this Question Constitute Sexual Harassment? Simmers 
v. Campbell Scientific Africa (Pty.) Ltd. (2014) 35 ILJ 2866 (LC); Campbell Scientific Africa (Pty.) Ltd. & A. 
Simmers Unreported Case CA 14/2014 (LAC) 23 October 2015’ (2016) 79 THRHR 325. 
135 Note 46 above, 11.  
136 Note 81 above, 225. 
137 Note 134 above, 325.  
138 See the Preamble of PHA.  
139 Ibid.  
140 Note 134 above, 325.  
141S Sewsunker ‘Inexpensive civil remedy for harassment: The Protection from Harassment Act’ (2013) De Rebus 
34-36.  
142 Note 134 above, 325.  
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Even though the main legal remedy offered by the PHA is a protection order, the PHA differs 
and goes further than the Domestic Violence Act.143 The latter act only allowed for a protection 
order to be granted to the victim if there was a domestic relationship, and thus, those who were 
not part of such relations were left without any protection.144 PHA has, therefore, rectified the 
shortfall in the Domestic Violence Act, as a protection order may be granted to any person who 
alleges that they were harassed and it is not a prerequisite to establish a domestic relationship.  
 
 
 A significant feature of PHA is the definition of sexual harassment: 
“any- 
(a) unwelcome sexual attention from a person who knows or ought reasonably to 
know that such attention is unwelcome; 
(b) unwelcome explicit or implicit behaviour, suggestions, messages or remarks of a 
sexual nature that have the effect of offending, intimidating or humiliating the 
complainant or a related person in circumstances, which a reasonable person 
having regard to all the circumstances would have anticipated that the complainant 
or related person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated; 
(c) implied or expressed promise of reward for complying with a sexually-oriented 
request; or 
(d)  implied or expressed threat of reprisal or actual reprisal for refusal to comply with 
a sexually oriented request.”145 
 
Therefore, in finding a link to the workplace in the context of sexual harassment, PHA is 
relevant because it provides a legal remedy by permitting a harassed employee to approach the 
court of his or her own accord to obtain a protection order against a co-employee or superior. 
 
However, the above is precisely where the problem arises, as it becomes the responsibility of 
the harassed employee to initiate steps to address sexual harassment against another co-
employee or superior, and yet the employer’s accountability for a failure to create a safe 
environment for employees is not called into question. Therefore, the last aspect of dealing 
with a discussion of the general laws is a consideration of the common law for an employer’s 
liability as a legal remedy for the harassed in the context of sexual harassment.  
                                                          
143 Note 141 above, 34-36. 
144 Ibid.   
145 Section 1 of PHA. 
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2.4.4 The Common Law 
An employee who is the subject of sexual harassment by another employee or their superior 
may invoke the common law of delict to hold the employer liable. This was established in J v 
M which stated that: 
“Sexual harassment, depending on the form it takes, will violate that right to integrity of body 
and personality which belongs to every person and which is protected in our legal system both 
criminally and civilly. An employer undoubtedly has a duty to ensure that its employees are not 
subjected to this form of violation within the work-place.”146 
 
The common law of delict in relation to employer liability in sexual harassment cases has, over 
the past years, been adjusted in order to bring the law in line with the spirit, purports and object 
of the Constitution.147 In terms of the law of delict, the employer may be held liable by the 
employee who has been sexually harassed by another employee, either directly or through 
vicarious liability.148  
 
2.4.4.1 Vicarious Liability 
In either direct or vicarious liability, the elements of a delict would firstly have to be proven.149 
In terms of vicarious liability, there are three main requirements that must be satisfied. Firstly, 
there must be an employee-employer relationship between the harasser and the employer; 
secondly, the employee (namely the harasser) must commit a delict (sexual harassment) and 
lastly, the employee (harasser) who committed the delict must have acted in the “course and 
scope of employment.”150  
 
The most relevant case in extending vicarious liability to a sexual harassment context is the 
Grobler case. 151 
 
In the Grobler case, one of the main issues considered was whether Nasper (the employer) 
should assume vicariously liable for the behaviour of Samuels (the harasser).152 Whitcher 
                                                          
146 Note 13 above, 757J-758A. 
147 Note 81 above, 247. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid.  
150 Ibid.  
151 Since the LAC’s judgment in the Grobler’s case is written in Afrikaans, reference to Whitcher’s journal article 
will be relied on in the following case discussion.  
152 Note 99 above, 530. 
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provides the following details of the case:153 Grobler was a secretary to Samuels who was a 
trainee manager. Sexual harassment incidents which Grobler was subjected to included 
groping, kissing, a finger forced in her mouth and the most serious incident been threatened 
with rape whilst held at gunpoint. Grobler had attempted on many occasions to report the 
incidents to persons who stood in higher positions than Samuels, however, no assistance was 
provided. In fact, some employees in senior positions witnessed certain incidents, yet none 
reported or made an effort to assist. Finally, assistance was provided when Grobler reported 
the incidents to labour relations consultants and a disciplinary hearing was conducted resulting 
in Samuels’ dismissal. Thereafter, Grobler developed PTSD and sought to claim her losses and 
damages associated with the disorder from Samuels, and in terms of vicarious liability from 
Nasper. 
 
Further, Whitcher states that the court had to address the main requirement, in relation to 
vicarious liability, namely, whether the unwelcome sexual conduct took place in the course and 
scope of the harasser’s employment. The court relied on foreign case law, whereby, it noted 
that the term “course and scope of employment” is often given a narrow interpretation and 
employers are often not held accountable by simply alleging that the conduct of harasser did 
not fall within the course and scope of employment.  
 
Moreover, Whitcher highlighted that the court relied on the US case of Faragher v City Boca 
Raton,154 which held that since sexual harassment is such an endemic in the workplace, an 
employer would foresee such risk occurring at work when employing persons, and thus, it is 
fair to ensure that the employer should be liable for the risk. The court then applied the foreign 
precedents and concluded that “course and scope of employment” should be interpreted 
broadly. 
 
The court held that since sexual harassment is such a common occurrence in most businesses, 
it is only fair that the harassed be left with recourse against the employer, especially where the 
harasser holds a senior position of trust, such as a manager.155 After a consideration of various 
factors, such as the fact that the relationship between a manager and secretary is more intense, 
Grobler was subordinate, and thus, more defenceless, it was concluded that there was a strong 
                                                          
153 Note 111 above, 1907- 1918. 
154 Faragher v City Boca Raton 524 US 775 (1998).   
155 Note 111 above, 1918. 
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nexus between sexual harassment occurring from the risk created by Nasper in employing 
Samuels as a trainee manager.156 Thus, Nasper was held vicariously liable.  
 
2.4.4.2 Direct Liability 
However, on appeal to the SCA,157 the issue of vicarious liability was not decided, as Nasper 
was held directly liable. Direct liability arose due to Nasper’s failure to prevent or act on 
complaints made by Grobler.158 Therefore, establishing wrongfulness in a delict requires the 
employer to have a legal duty to limit or prevent the harm, namely the sexual harassment, from 
occurring.159 The legal duty is established when, according to the boni mores of society, it 
would be reasonable for the employer to have taken precautions to prevent sexual 
harassment.160  
 
Thus, the SCA found that Nasper had a legal duty to prevent Grobler from being sexually 
harassed by her manager and to protect her against the psychological injury that arises from 
sexual harassment.161 Lastly, the court also made it clear that the mere fact that legislation 
provides for remedies for employer liability does not prevent an employee from exercising 
common law remedies to hold the employer responsible for the unwelcome sexual acts of their 
employees.162  
 
The general laws were analysed above in order to determine the applicability of the laws in 
cases of sexual harassment, further, to provide comprehensive definitions of harassment and 
most importantly, to establish the legal remedies that are available for employees who have 
been sexually harassed. Notwithstanding the general laws, it will become apparent that there 
was a need for the enactment of labour legislation designed to address the endemic of sexual 
harassment manifesting specifically in the workplace. Thus, the LRA and the EEA, along with 
the Codes attached to the latter, will be assessed below.  
 
 
 
                                                          
156 Ibid 1919.  
157 Note 115 above.  
158 Note 81 above, 249. 
159 Ibid.  
160 Note 81 above, 249. See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 597B.  
161 Note 115 above, 1024 para 65. See Note 81 above, 249. 
162 Note 115 above, 1025 para 69. See Note 81 above, 250. 
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2.5 Labour Laws 
2.5.1 LRA 
The LRA correlates to sexual harassment through unfair labour practices and more specifically 
unfair dismissals.163 
 
2.5.1.1 Unfair Dismissal 
Sexual harassment incidents in the workplace are usually dealt with as a misconduct.164 In the 
context of sexual harassment, dismissals may arise in two circumstances. In the first instance, 
the employee, who is the harasser, is dismissed for a misconduct.165 Secondly, the harassed 
employee may resign due to the sexual harassment incidents which the employer did not 
address.166 The latter is referred to as constructive dismissal which is regulated by section 
186(1)(e). Constructive dismissal arises where the employer created intolerable employment 
conditions, whereby, the employee’s only solution is their resignation.167 It must be noted that 
constructive dismissal, in cases of sexual harassment, is common, as the employer created 
intolerable work conditions due to their inaction to combat the harassment.168  
 
In cases of unfair dismissal, the employee has the onus to prove that there was a dismissal, and 
thereafter, the onus shifts to the employer to show it was fair.169 Thus, the employee in sexual 
harassment matters who had allegedly been constructively dismissed merely has to establish 
that the dismissal fell into section 186(1)(e).170 
 
However, if a dismissal is for any reason listed in section 187, the dismissal would be 
automatically unfair.171 In relation to sexual harassment, if it can be established that the 
dismissal was based on the grounds in section 187(1)(f), specifically the grounds of sex or 
gender, as sexual harassment is not expressly stipulated as a ground, the dismissal would be 
deemed automatically unfair.172 It seems that the automatically unfair dismissal may be viewed 
                                                          
163 Note 1 above, 21. 
164 Note 4 above, 442. 
165 Note 1 above, 22. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Note 99 above, 526. 
169 Section 192 of the LRA. 
170 Note 1 above, 22. 
171 Note 81 above, 254. 
172 Ibid.  
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as a “third” type of dismissal in relation to sexual harassment. However, this was rejected in 
the Ntsabo case. 
 
In this case, Ntsabo, who was employed by Real Security CC as a security guard, was subjected 
to various acts of sexual harassment by her supervisor Mr Dlomo which culminated in him 
assaulting her.173 She and her brother, who had laid a complainant separately on her behalf, 
attempted to report the issue, however, nothing was initiated to address the sexual harassment 
occurring at work; thus, resignation was the only option, as the inaction of the employer to 
combat the sexual harassment created intolerable working conditions.174 
 
Ntsabo sought relief through the provisions of the EEA for patrimonial damages, such as 
medical fees, and non-patrimonial damages, for inter alia contumelia.175 Additionally, a claim 
was made in terms of section 187(1)(f) and alternatively in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the 
LRA.176 
 
The court rejected the notion that the constructive dismissal amounted to an automatically 
unfair discrimination in terms of section 187(1)(f) due to the fact that it was not alleged by the 
employee as a ground for resignation.177  
 
The Labour Court, however, found that in terms of section186(1)(e), constructive dismissal 
was proved by Ntsabo in that the employer failed to address the complaints brought forward 
by the harassed and her brother and, therefore, created an intolerable work environment which 
resulted in her resignation.178 Thus, due to her unfair dismissal, compensation was awarded up 
to 12 months in terms of the LRA, as well as the damages in terms of the EEA.179 
 
Since the court rejected that the dismissal was automatically unfair, doubling the compensation 
in terms of section 194(3) did not occur in casu.180 However, in Christian v Colliers 
Properties,181 the employee claimed that she was dismissed in terms of section 187(1)(f) on 
                                                          
173 Note 99 above, 524. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid 526. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Note 1 above, 23. 
178 Ibid.  
179 Note 99 above, 526. 
180 Note 81 above, 254. 
181 Christian v Colliers Properties (2005) 26 ILJ 234 (LC). 
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the basis of her failure to accept the unwelcome sexual advances, which amounted to sexual 
harassment.182 Since it was established that her dismissal was automatically unfair, she was 
awarded 24 months compensation in terms of section 194(3).183 
 
Notwithstanding the above with regards to section 187(1)(f), there has been a replacement of 
this section by the anti-discrimination provisions of the EEA. 
 
2.5.2 EEA 
One of the main objectives of the EEA is to regulate discrimination in the workplace.184 This 
is evident from section 6(1) which notes that no one should discriminate unfairly against an 
employee on certain grounds which include, amongst other things, sex and gender – the 
grounds most relevant in cases of sexual harassment.185 Section 6(3) provides that harassment, 
thereby, including sexual harassment, “is a form of unfair discrimination” against a harassed 
employee.186 
 
Section 60 provides for employer liability and avoidance thereof. It must be noted that 
employer liability, discussed above, in terms of the common law, which is regulated by the law 
of delict in terms of vicarious or direct liability differs from liability in terms of the EEA.187 
The difference arises firstly from the requirements under the act as opposed to the common law 
and secondly, the purposes for employer liability differ between the act and common law.188 
The purpose of employer liability provided by the EEA is essentially to punish employers for 
their inaction to prevent the harassment resulting, whereas, the purpose of the common law is 
to penalise employers for the wrongful behaviour of their employee (the harasser).189 
 
As explained above, the Grobler case was brought under the common law in order to hold the 
employer liable. The Ntsabo case, therefore, differed from the Grobler case, as the employer 
was held liable in terms of the EEA for the employer’s breach of its statutory obligation to take 
action in an attempt to prevent the harassment from culminating in the workplace.190  
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Thus, an employer could attribute liability for cases of sexual harassment in specific 
circumstances, whereby, the requirements set out in section 60(1)-(4) of the EEA are 
satisfied.191 Section 60(1) provides that where an employee, “while at work,” is in violation of 
any provision of the act, such as harassment of another employee, this “must immediately be 
brought to the attention of the employer.”192 The requirements, “while at work” and 
“immediately” will be interpreted further.  
 
Firstly, “while at work” should be interpreted more broadly than the requirement within 
“course and scope of employment” under the common law.193 “While at work” is understood 
to mean “in the workplace” or where employees are involved in activities which are work-
related.194 
 
Secondly, the word “immediately” was interpreted in Ntsabo to mean within a reasonable time 
which does not simply mean reporting the incident of harassment to the employer within 
minutes of its occurrence.195 The Labour Court accepted that the circumstances giving rise to 
the case are important in the determination of reasonable time.196 In casu, the fact that the 
harassed reported the incident to her family in order to seek advice before reporting it to the 
employer did not mean that it was not reported immediately, as this was part of her family 
custom.197  
 
Section 60(2) notes that once the employer is made aware of the alleged conduct (of sexual 
harassment), they must conduct a consultation with the affected parties and take all relevant 
measures to eradicate the sexual harassment, failure of which, according to section 60(3), 
liability will be attributed to the employer for contravention of subsection 2.198 According to 
section 60(4) of the EEA, the employer may avoid liability where they did what was reasonably 
necessary to ensure that sexual harassment does not occur at work. 
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However, in the Ntsabo case, despite the complaints laid by the harassed, as well as her brother, 
the employer failed to take steps to combat the incidents of sexual harassment of its employee, 
and was thus in contravention of section 60(2) and held liable.199  
 
It has been established that the EEA does not provide a precise definition of sexual harassment 
except that it is a form of unfair discrimination.200 Moreover, the EEA does not provide 
procedures for handling incidents of harassment in the workplace.201 Therefore, a consideration 
of the 1998 and 2005 Codes will ensue. 
 
2.5.3 The 1998 and 2005 Codes of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment 
Cases 
The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), due to the provisions 
in section 203 of the LRA, developed the 1998 Code.202 Yet again, in 2005 a further Code was 
issued by NEDLAC in terms of section 54 of the EEA to conform to international obligations 
in terms of certain ILO conventions in combating sexual harassment in the workplace.203  
 
However, it must be noted that the Codes were/are used as guidelines to shape the law regarding 
sexual harassment.204 Therefore, what will be analysed below is the definition or test each Code 
provides to establish sexual harassment, the different forms of sexual harassment, as well as 
contrasting the similarities and differences between the Codes. 
 
2.5.3.1 The 1998 Code 
The 1998 Code has been criticised, as it failed to recognise that sexual harassment constitutes 
unfair discrimination.205 A further criticism was the uncertainty in the test and definition of 
sexual harassment.206 Item 3 states that:  
“(1) Sexual harassment is unwanted conduct of a sexual nature. The unwanted nature of 
sexual harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome and mutual. 
(2) Sexual attention becomes sexual harassment if: 
                                                          
199 Note 111 above, 1922. 
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 a. The behaviour is persisted in, although a single incident of harassment can constitute           
sexual harassment; and/or  
 b. The recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is considered offensive; and/or  
 c. The perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is regarded as unacceptable.” 
 
It is apparent that there was a distinction between sexual harassment and sexual attention 
between consenting adults at work.207 Item 3(2) provided that sexual attention may develop 
into sexual harassment if the elements in the latter item are met.208 The wording “and/or” 
implied that a single factor in a-c above only needs to be present for harassment to be 
established which could mean that the mere fact that the behaviour was continuous, without 
considering whether it was welcomed by the two parties, could result in conduct amounting to 
sexual harassment.209 The latter was problematic. 
 
Item 4 of the Code described the different forms that sexual harassment may take which is not 
a closed list. Non-verbal sexual harassment included “unwelcome gestures, indecent exposure, 
and the unwelcome display of sexually explicit pictures and objects.”210 Verbal harassment 
included, inter alia, unwelcome suggestions, hints and innuendos, sexual jokes and even 
includes whistling at persons.211 On the opposite end of the spectrum was the more serious 
form, namely physical contact,212 which included anything from “touching to sexual assault 
and rape, and includes a strip search by or in the presence of the opposite sex.”213 Moreover, 
quid pro quo harassment and sexual favouritism were listed as a form of sexual harassment in 
item 4. However, it seems that a better approach is to define the latter as an effect of harassment 
instead of classifying it as a form of harassment.214 
 
Quid pro quo harassment occurs where someone attempts to influence the employment process, 
benefits, dismissal or promotions, inter alia, in exchange for sexual favours by the employee 
or job applicant.215 This usually occurs where there are power imbalances in the workplace.216 
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Sexual favouritism occurs when employees who respond to the sexual conduct of the harasser 
only receive employment benefits from a person in a superior position, whilst those who reject 
the sexual advances are denied such benefits in the workplace.217  
 
The remainder of the Code namely, items 5-10 focused on the duty of employers to prevent 
sexual harassment at work, the obligation to establish policies on sexual harassment and to 
create clear procedures, both formal and informal, to deal with incidents of sexual 
harassment.218 
 
2.5.3.2 The 2005 Code 
Due to the criticism above, the main improvements of the 2005 Code were that a new test was 
developed in item 4 for the determination of sexual harassment and item 3 now clearly states 
that “sexual harassment in the working environment is a form of unfair discrimination.”219  
 
Item 4 states that:  
“Sexual harassment is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that violates the rights of an 
employee and constitutes a barrier to equity in the workplace, taking into account all of the 
following factors:  
4.1 whether the harassment is on the prohibited grounds of sex and/or gender and/or sexual 
orientation;  
4.2  whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome;  
4.3  the nature and extent of the sexual conduct; and  
4.4  the impact of the sexual conduct on the employee.” 
 
2.5.3.3 Comparison of the 1998 and 2005 Codes 
Unlike the 1998 Code, the element of “persisted sexual advances” does not appear in the 2005 
Code for the establishment of sexual harassment. Further, the distinction between sexual 
harassment and sexual attention also does not feature.220  
 
The similarities between the Codes are that the objectives stated in item 1 are the same. The 
different types of harassment are similarly stated to include physical, verbal and nonverbal 
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conduct. Moreover, both Codes provide for informal and formal procedures when dealing with 
incidents of sexual harassment.221  
 
However, the difference arises in that the effect of harassment now extends in the 2005 Code 
to include victimisation, whereas, the 1998 Code only stated quid pro quo and sexual 
favouritism.222 Victimisation results when an employee is prejudiced at work for not accepting 
the unwelcome conduct by the harasser.223 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that both Codes leave 
out a hostile work environment when considering the effect of harassment.224 This occurs 
where a toxic work environment is created through, for example, pornographic images being 
displayed in the workplace.225  
 
The 1998 Code in item (3)(2)(c) attributed fault to the harasser by highlighting that “the 
perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is regarded as unacceptable.”226 Since sexual 
harassment is often dealt with as a misconduct in the workplace, fault is an important 
consideration.227 On the other hand, in the 2005 Code, the element of fault in the test for sexual 
harassment is disregarded, as fault is not required in discrimination law, which is in line with 
the EEA.228  
 
Even though the 2005 Code is only in force, it must be noted that the 1998 Code was attached 
to legislation which has a different purpose to the Act in which the 2005 Code is attached. The 
1998 Code was attached to the LRA which mainly deals with unfair dismissals, and the 2005 
Code is attached to the EEA which is concerned with discriminatory issues in the workplace. 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that when dealing with sexual harassment as a misconduct, which 
could result in a possible dismissal, the 1998 Code would have been the more suitable Code to 
rely upon for guidance.229 This would have ensured that the requirement of fault was considered 
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when determining sexual harassment, whereas, the guidelines established by the 2005 Code 
should be relied upon when sexual harassment is handled as an unfair discrimination case.230 
 
Lastly, it is noteworthy that in both the 1998 and 2005 Codes, for conduct to amount to sexual 
harassment it must either be unwanted or unwelcome which are viewed as synonyms.231 The 
latter is considered one of the most important elements in the determination of sexual 
harassment.232 Thus, the sexual harassment incident must be unwelcome/unwanted.233 For 
instance, PEPUDA overlaps with the 1998 Code in that the conduct must be unwanted; whereas 
PHA and the ILO Special Survey234 overlaps with the 2005 Code which provides that the 
conduct of the harasser should be unwelcome for the establishment of sexual harassment.235  
 
Therefore, it will become apposite, in the next chapter, to critically analyse the unwelcome 
element required in sexual harassment cases, as the unwelcome/unwanted element is the 
obvious common denominator across the definitions, assessed above, which is necessary for 
the establishment of sexual harassment.236 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
In closing, this chapter has briefly touched on the law on sexual harassment from an 
international, general and labour law perspective with particular emphasis on the definition of 
sexual harassment and the legal remedies available to victims of sexual harassment.  
 
Particular emphasis is placed on the last sentiments of this chapter which highlights that the 
unwelcome element is seen as a prerequisite in most definitions for establishing sexual 
harassment and must be analysed further.  
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CHAPTER 3 
UNPACKING THE UNWELCOME ELEMENT237 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a crucial question will be addressed, which will set the tone for the rest of this 
dissertation, namely, what is the unwelcome element required for the determination of sexual 
harassment. From the onset of this chapter, it is noteworthy that the term “unwanted” will be 
used interchangeably with the term “unwelcome”.238 The latter will collectively be described 
as the unwelcome element. As noted in chapter 2, it is clear that the unwelcome element sits at 
the forefront when defining sexual harassment across international and local laws. Thus, it is 
apposite to unpack this requirement further in which there will be a reliance on US case law. 
 
Further, the test used for the determination of sexual harassment, in which the unwelcome 
element is a prominent feature, will be assessed with particular reference to whose perspective 
should be relied upon to establish whether the conduct was unwelcome. Lastly, the problems 
associated with the unwelcome element will be considered which will provide a causal link to 
the next chapter.  
 
3.2 Defining the Unwelcome Element 
As noted in the previous chapter, the unwanted element is a prominent feature for the 
establishment of sexual harassment.239 In fact, in almost all jurisdictions, the unwelcome 
conduct of the harasser is necessary for the determination of sexual harassment.240 Specifically 
in relation to SA, the importance of the unwelcome element is evident from case law, such as 
Pillay and Old Mutual Property (Pty) Ltd,241 which held that the unwelcome or unwanted 
component is essential in cases of sexual harassment.242 This is corroborated in Zaindeen and 
Clicks Retailers (Pty) Ltd 243 which held that “[a] very important element of the offence of 
sexual harassment is that the conduct must have been unwanted, unsolicited and offensive to 
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the complainant.”244  Therefore, the importance of the unwelcome element, in relation to sexual 
harassment cases, provides a legitimate basis for the element to be critically defined.  
 
According to the South African Oxford Pocket Dictionary, “unwelcome” is defined as “not 
welcome or unacceptable.” Furthermore, “unwanted” is defined by the Oxford English Living 
Dictionaries as “not or no longer desired.” 245 On the contrary, “welcome” is defined in the 
American Heritage Dictionary as “I. Received with pleasure and hospitality into one’s 
company. 2. Gratifying 3. Cordially permitted or invited, as to do or enjoy.”246 The dictionary 
meanings do not provide the definition of unwelcome in the context of sexual harassment. 
 
Therefore, a reliance on US law will be examined, as it is well established that the US was the 
first country to formally describe sexual harassment as a term and acknowledged it as a form 
of discrimination against women.247 With particular reference to the unwelcome element, US 
law has developed extensively through cases, as opposed to legislation.248  Thus, there is 
literary value in analysing such cases further.    
 
3.3 US Law 
Before an analysis of US case law is undertaken, a brief history of how the unwelcome element 
became the “gravamen” of sexual harassment cases in the US will be provided. It must be noted 
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a “US federal agency 
responsible for enforcing Title VII,”249 distinguishes between two forms of harassment namely, 
quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.250 Both forms were explained in the 
previous chapter. Notwithstanding the distinction between the two forms, for both quid pro quo 
and hostile work environment harassment, there is a need to establish that the conduct of a 
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sexual nature was unwelcome.251 However, in terms of quid pro quo harassment, the 
unwelcome element was not tantamount to the enquiry.252  
 
Moreover, for some time, only quid pro quo harassment warranted a claim for sexual 
harassment, however, from 1981, courts in the US started to recognise a hostile work 
environment as a basis for sexual harassment claims.253 This was evident in the case of Henson 
v City of Dundee254 which held that there was no need to establish a tangible loss or extension 
of job benefits in sexual harassment cases, in other words, only claims arising from quid pro 
quo harassment.255  
 
Apart from advancing the hostile work environment doctrine,256 the Henson case provided five 
elements that needed to be proved by the harassed in order to succeed in a sexual harassment 
claim due to a hostile work environment, of which the unwelcome requirement is one of the 
elements.257 The court defined the unwelcome element as follows: 
“unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the 
employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.”258  
 
Simply put, the above definition notes that the harassed must establish that he or she did not 
encourage or enjoy the conduct of the harasser.259 The five-part element test set out in the 
Henson case is regarded as the primary test for the determination of sexual harassment in the 
US.260 However, challenges were faced by courts, as the last part of the definition of the 
unwelcome element, quoted above, was subjective.261 As such, even though the harassed may 
find the conduct of the harasser subjectively offensive and thus unwelcome; the harassed’s 
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conduct may, nonetheless, still indicate that the sexual behaviour was “welcomed” from the 
perspective of the harasser.262  
 
Light was shed four years after the Henson case when the US Supreme Court firstly validated 
sexual harassment as a claim on the basis of hostile work environment263 in Meritor Savings 
Bank, FSB v Vinson ET AL,264 and most importantly, required the unwelcome element be 
entrenched as a threshold in the sexual harassment enquiry.265 This was evident when the court 
held that “[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances 
were “unwelcome.”” 266 In this case, Ms Vinson had intercourse with her supervisor out of fear 
that her rejection would result in job loss and was also the victim of certain violent acts inflicted 
by him.267 She was dismissed for overuse of her sick leave.268  
 
The main argument put forward by the Bank was that since there was a voluntary sexual 
relationship between the harasser and Ms Vinson, it could not be deemed sexual harassment 
and the district court accepted this line of argument269 However, the Supreme Court rejected 
the district court’s understanding of voluntariness in the context of unwelcome element, 270 and 
made it clear that the harassed could engage in sexual conduct, without being forced, or having 
a gun to her head, nonetheless, it could still not be welcomed.271 Therefore, voluntariness is not 
decisive in the unwelcome enquiry.272 Since the unwelcome element is considered the most 
problematic requirement for the establishment of sexual harassment,273 the Meritor case will 
be considered only with particular reference to the unwelcome aspect.  
 
                                                          
262 Ibid. 
263 Note 253 above, 1558.  
264Meritor Savings Bank FSB v Vinson ET AL 477 U.S. 57 (1986).  Hereinafter referred to as the Meritor case or 
Meritor.  
265 L Salmon ‘Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It That in the Process He Does Not Become a Monster: 
The Necessity of Maintaining and Narrowing the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Suits’ (2002) 
77 Ind. L. J. 617.  
266 Note 264 above, para 68.  
267 Note 249 above, 624.  
268 Note 253 above, 1572.  
269 Ibid.  
270 Ibid. 
271 Note 264 above, para 68. See Note 32 above, 94. 
272 L Ramsini ‘The Unwelcome Requirement in Sexual Harassment: Choosing a Perspective and Incorporating 
the Effect of Supervisor-Subordinate Relations’ (2014) 55 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 1967.  
273 Note 7 above, 426.  
 36 
 
The court, in the Meritor case, further acknowledged that the unwelcome element will cause 
problems when it comes to proof and credibility.274 It seems that the court departed from the 
Henson case in that a more objective assessment was used. This was evident when the court 
stated that the unwelcome element turns on whether the harassed “by her conduct indicated 
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.”275 Moreover, in determining whether the 
harasser’s conduct was unwelcome, the “totality of the circumstances” should be considered 
which includes the nature of the sexual behaviour and context.276   
 
Lastly, with regards to the assessment of the unwelcome element, the court made a profound 
statement regarding speech and dress by rejecting the district court’s finding that speech and 
dress was irrelevant evidence.277 The Supreme Court held that indeed speech and dress was 
admissible evidence when it comes to deciding if the harasser’s conduct was unwelcome.278 
The latter, therefore, places specific focus on the harassed’s responses and deflects from the 
harasser’s conduct.279 This sheds light and is a brief introduction to the problems regarding the 
unwelcome element which will be discussed further below. Thus, both the Henson and Meritor 
cases provide that the harassed conduct is of central importance to the overall sexual 
harassment claim.280 
 
3.4 South African Law  
Since the above has explored US case law in the interpretation of the unwelcome element, an 
analysis of how the unwelcome element is understood in South African law will ensue, 
whereby; emphasis will be placed on the Codes of Good Practice due to the fact that they are 
important when providing guidelines for the determination of sexual harassment.281 
 
 
 
                                                          
274 Note 264 above, para 68.  
275 Note 264 above, para 68. See note 272 above, 1967.  
276 Note 264 above, para 69. See Note 248 above, 750.  
277 Note 264 above, para 68 and 69.  
278 Ibid para 69 –“…it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a 
matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, 
such evidence is obviously relevant.” See also Note 253 above, 1573.  
279 W Pollack ‘Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions’ (1990) 13 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
58.  
280 Note 251 above, 1166. 
281 Note 129 above, 235.  
 37 
 
3.4.1 1998 Code of Good Practice on Handling Sexual Harassment Cases 
The unwelcome element stood out explicitly in item 3(1) of the 1998 Code when defining 
sexual harassment as “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature.” The Code explained that “the 
unwanted nature of sexual harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome and 
mutual.”282 The distinction implied that there can be sexual conduct between persons who 
consent283 and recognised that interaction amongst sexes is highly probable in the workplace.284  
 
Thus, this distinction supports the argument in favour of the unwelcome element in that its 
biggest justification lies in the fact that legal action should not be taken for consensual sexual 
relations occurring in the workplace.285 This is linked to US law whereby the EEOC provides 
that sexual harassment claims should not be a mechanism, whereby, a party to consensual 
workplace sexual relationship punishes the other, such as an employee who was dismissed or 
an abandoned lover.286   
 
Moreover, reference to the unwelcome element was provided in item 3(2) in which 
requirements are set out to determine when sexual attention (considered welcomed sexual 
advances) progresses into sexual harassment (considered unwelcome sexual advances).287 
Thus, welcomed sexual advances would be considered unwelcome when the harassed “has 
made it clear that the behaviour is considered offensive; and/or”288  the harassed “should have 
known that the behaviour is regarded as unacceptable.”289 With regards to the terms “offensive” 
or “unacceptable”, used in item 3(2) (b) and (c) above, it would seem, according to the 
dictionary meaning, that the terms “offensive” or “unacceptable” could be used 
interchangeably with the word unwelcome.290   
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With particular reference to item 3(2)(b), it could be argued that the requirement implied that 
true sexual harassment can only occur when the harassed did not welcome, encourage, promote 
or participate in the sexual attention.291  
 
Item 3(2)(b) is supported in Sadulla v Jules Katz & Co,292 whereby, an employee was dismissed 
for sexual harassment, however, the arbitrator found that sexual harassment did not result, as 
the harassed female employee did not indicate that the sex talk was offensive, despite 
subjectivity feeling uncomfortable, and further, reciprocated the conduct by answering the 
questions posed equally in a sexual manner.293 Cloete C held that:  
“In a case of sexual harassment proper, one would not expect the victim to initiate certain new 
trends in the conversation, or to introduce fresh material and notions, especially about her/his 
own sexual life or private bodily parts. There can of course be circumstances that justify a 
victim in doing this, but they would have to be exceptional, as the primary object of the victim 
should be discouragement and protestation.”294 
 
Further, the words “made it clear” in item 3(2)(b) implied that the harassed should have 
expressly stated to the harasser that he or she finds the sexual conduct offensive/ unwelcome.295 
This requirement of active confrontation was problematic due to the fact that the harassed may 
respond differently depending on the personality of the harassed or power imbalance between 
the harassed and harasser in the workplace.296 Some personalities result in the harassed opting 
for a more subtle approach, such as ignoring or brushing off the behaviour, whereas, others 
would express their discomfort head-on.297 Light is shed on the latter in the next chapter. 
 
3.4.2 2005 Code of Good Practice on Handling Sexual Harassment Cases 
As noted in the previous chapter, the 2005 code was implemented and of importance was that 
it set out the test for sexual harassment in item 4, whereby, inter alia, a factor of the test for the 
establishment of sexual harassment asks “whether the sexual conduct was unwelcome.”298 To 
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ensure that the test was articulated clearly, so as to avoid any confusion - item 5 was inserted 
which elaborates on the factors listed in item 4.299  
 
Item 5.2 breaks down the requirement of unwelcome conduct. Firstly, item 3(2)(b) of the 1998 
Code was phrased ambiguously and did not provide for the type of behaviour that would 
indicate that the harasser’s conduct was unwelcome.300 The 2005 Code aimed to remedy this 
by highlighting that there are various methods that can be used by the harassed to indicate to 
the harasser that their conduct is unwelcome which includes a nonverbal form of 
communication, such as ignoring the harasser or simply walking away.301 However, if it was a 
single occurrence of unwelcome sexual advances in which the harassed was unable to 
communicate that it was unwelcome, then the test would turn on whether the harasser should 
reasonably have been aware that the sexual advances were unwelcome.302 
 
Further, the Code provides that previous sexual conduct that was once welcomed does not 
imply that such conduct will be welcomed in the future.303 This sheds light on the fact that a 
consensual sexual office romance which occurred in the past cannot negate the fact that the 
sexual conduct may be unwelcome in the future.304 Thus, it can be concluded that previous 
participation in sexual advances does not mean that they remain welcome in the future which 
arises the moment that the harassed holds the conduct to no longer be welcome.305  
 
However, because it has been recognised that sexual conduct is ambiguous,306 and since a 
previous consensual sexual workplace relationship could add to the ambiguity, it has been 
suggested that the harassed must communicate clearly that the conduct is unwelcome to avoid 
uncertainty and the harasser arguing differently.307  
 
With the above said, evidence of consensual past conduct should not simply be brushed aside 
due to the insertion of the provision and still plays a role in instances where for example, the 
victim alleges that jokes of a sexual nature amount to sexual harassment yet she subsequently 
                                                          
299 Note 23 above, 1729.   
300 Ibid.  
301 Item 5.2 of the 2005 Code.  
302 Note 1 above, 32 and 33.  
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participated in such behaviour.308 Issues of an office romance and past conduct, in the context 
of the unwelcome element, will be analysed further in the next chapter. 
 
Lastly, where it is challenging for the harassed to effectively express that the conduct is 
unwelcome, the harassed may ask another such as “a co-worker, superior, counsellor, human 
resource official, family member or friend” to communicate this.309 
 
3.5 The Test for Sexual Harassment  
 Understanding the test will provide clarity as to whose perspective should be considered to 
determine if the conduct was unwelcome.  
 
As alluded to in the previous chapter, one of the most problematic aspects of the 1998 Code 
which arose from the definition in item 3, was whether sexual harassment should be determined 
from a subjective or objective perspective.310 It has been confirmed that item 4 of the 2005 
Code is the test for sexual harassment which contains both subjective and objective elements.311 
The 2005 formulation results in, as it has been termed,  “the rub” of the sexual harassment 
enquiry due to the fact that the harassed may subjectively unwelcome the conduct of a sexual 
nature, yet in the eyes of the harasser or other co-workers, the conduct may seem welcomed.312 
With that said, there is a correlation between how women respond to sexual harassment and 
moreover, how males, who are likely to be the harassers, interpret the responses.  
 
Women’s responses to unwelcome sexual advances depend on what is available in the 
circumstances which are decided based on what is at risk, such as fear of losing their job and 
how it would affect their children.313 This is referred to as rational based reasoning, a response 
associated with women which is less confrontational.314 
 
The problem arises in regard to the unwelcome element315 because courts expect women to 
follow the right-based reasoning, a response associated with men, to show that the conduct of 
                                                          
308 Note 4 above, 431.  
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the harasser was not welcome, such as following the formal route of reporting the incident, 
which is farfetched from the reality of how women actually show that the advances are 
unwelcome.316 
 
Furthermore, studies indicate that men sexualise responses given by women and find that 
women are sexually interested even when this is obviously not the case.317 This can be 
explained by assessing different gender perceptions regarding sexual harassment. Therefore, 
studies show that men hold what women view as harassment as simply “good fun”.318 Further, 
research indicated that men were more inclined to believe that offence should not be taken as 
quickly if a person were to express their sexual interest in another and that men were more 
inclined to rate sexual harassment as overly exaggerated in modern day society.319 Thus, due 
to how females respond to unwelcome sexual advances and how males’ perceptions differ from 
females it becomes imperative when assessing the test for sexual harassment, to determine from 
whose perspective the conduct should be considered unwelcome.320  
 
It is noteworthy that the confusion relating to whose perspective the conduct should be 
considered unwelcome from mainly arises in cases of sexual harassment involving a hostile 
work environment and where conduct is verbal.321 This is so because it is easier to detect sexual 
harassment in quid pro quo harassment cases where a tangible benefit for the job is lost or 
where the unwelcome advances were physical in nature.322  
 
The unwelcome element is a prominent feature in the test for sexual harassment, in fact, there 
seems to be a blur between the test for sexual harassment, and the test for whether the conduct 
was unwelcome, as the enquiry evokes a similar question.323 Originally, Halfkenny highlighted 
that the enquiry asks whether the harassed found the conduct of the harasser to be unwelcome 
– the subjective test and secondly, whether the harasser reasonably believed that his conduct 
                                                          
316 Ibid 754 and 755.  
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was unwelcome – the objective test.324 The objective test holds firm in the 1998 Code which 
noted that sexual attention only transpires into harassment if inter alia the harasser should have 
known that his behaviour was unwelcome.325  
 
3.5.1 Subjective Test 
Courts seem to be inconsistent in applying the test for sexual harassment; however, three tests 
have been recognised, whereby, different perspectives either from the harasser, harassed or 
both are considered.326 Firstly, the subjective test focuses solely on the feelings or perspective 
of the harassed.327 The case of Motsamai v Everite Buildings Products328 is supportive of a 
subjective a test which is evident below: 
“Sexual harassment is the most heinous misconduct that plagues a workplace; not only is it 
demeaning to the victim, it undermines the dignity, integrity and self-worth of the employee 
harassed. The harshness of the wrong is compounded when the victim suffers it at the hands of 
his/her supervisor. Sexual harassment goes to the root of one’s being and must therefore be 
viewed from the point of view of a victim: how does he/she perceive it, and whether or not the 
perception is reasonable.”329 
 
Even though sexual harassment is a personal experience and there must be a consideration of 
the harassed’s perspective, a purely subjective test has raised caution, as the harassed may be 
overly sensitive which can result in a senseless claim against the harasser.330 Moreover, this 
could result in liability without fault, yet fault is an important factor in cases where sexual 
harassment is treated as a misconduct in the workplace.331 
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3.5.2 Purely Objective Test 
Secondly, a purely objective test asks whether the harasser knew or “ought reasonably to have 
known” that the sexual conduct was unwelcome.332 This approach was evident in the case of 
Gerber v Algorax (Pty) Ltd333 which states: 
“I am also of the view that the test to be applied to determine whether the conduct of the alleged 
perpetrator constitutes sexual harassment, should be an objective one. Campanella & Brassey in 
their article entitled '. . . To Refrain From Embracing' in Employment Law vol 10 part 4, 
suggested that the test is whether the advances were welcome or whether the accused 
reasonably believed them to be so. So much was clear to the drafters of the Ontario Human 
Rights Code. They defined harassment as 'engaging in a course of vexations comment 
or conduct that is known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome.”334 
 
Further, in Gregory v Russells (Pty) Ltd,335 a subjective test was acknowledged; however, the 
court held that given the different cultural perceptions of what constitutes flirtation and sexual 
conduct in South Africa – an objective test will be the decisive factor in sexual harassment 
cases.336  
 
3.5.3 A Possible New Formulation of the Objective Test 
It clear from the above cases that the courts have endorsed, what has been coined, a “purely” 
objective test337 and even though the purely objective test ensures that there will be no frivolous 
claims for sexual harassment, as a result of a hypersensitive victim, caution is raised.338 The 
reason is due to the studies explained above which indicate that males are less likely than 
females to recognise that their conduct constitutes sexual harassment, and thus, the objective 
test supports the all too often defence used by males that they did not know that their conduct 
was harassment and accepts the traditional norm of behaviour amongst males.339  
 
In an attempt to remedy the above, it seems as if there has been a change regarding the 
perspective of the purely objective test and the “new” formulation of the objective test now 
asks if a reasonable person would not consider the conduct of a sexual nature hostile, if so then 
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sexual harassment did not occur.340 Therefore, even though the perspective is now viewed from 
a reasonable person, which on the face of it seems impartial, the reality of our patriarchal 
society results in what is referred to as the reasonable man test.341 Thus, despite the change in 
perspective, the new formulation of the objective test has been criticised as still being viewed 
from a male perspective which neglects a female’s point of view.342 The US has recognised 
such which is evident in the case of Ellison v Brady343 where the court held that “the perspective 
of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person 
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experience of 
women.”344 
 
3.5.4 Compromise Test 
From the above, the subjective and objective tests either view whether the sexual conduct was 
unwelcome or hostile from the perceptive of the harassed or harasser (the reasonable person) 
and both tests present challenges. In an attempt to rectify the latter, a balanced perspective was 
developed which is seen as a compromise between both the subjective and objective test.345 
This test has often been referred to as the “reasonable victim” test and ensures that the 
perceptions or the feelings of the harassed are considered (subjective component) whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the encompassing circumstances are accounted for so as to balance the 
perspective of the harasser (objective component).346  
 
The reasonable victim test ensures that the perspective of women, are considered,347 and the 
fact that the circumstances are considered means that any element necessary to establish the 
surrounding circumstances, such as fault on the part of the harasser will be examined.348 
Therefore, a result will be arrived at that is inclusive of all parties in the sexual harassment 
enquiry.349  
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A compromise for both the subjective and objective test is evident in the case of Taljaard and 
Securicor350 where Jamodien C held that the test is not based on whether the harasser 
reasonably believed that his conduct of a sexual nature was welcomed but rather asks, whether, 
from the harassed’s perspective, the conduct was unwelcome (subjective component) and 
additionally, assesses whether a reasonable person, placed in the shoes of the harassed, 
considers the conduct unwelcome (objective component).351 It is submitted that the latter aspect 
of the compromise test is more in line with the new formulation of the objective test stated 
above. This is further corroborated by the fact that the purely objective test was adopted in 
older cases as noted above, whereas, the Taljaard case is more recent.  
 
3.6 The Problematic Unwelcome Element 
Notwithstanding the fact that the “reasonable victim” test is considered the better approach, it 
is not short of criticism. The biggest criticism of the test is that is it scrutinises the conduct of 
the harassed.352 This is causally connected to the Meritor case which notes that in determining 
whether the conduct of a sexual nature was unwelcome, speech and dress are relevant to the 
enquiry and, as such the conduct of the victim becomes central to the unwelcome element. This 
results in the harasser, as part of his defence, introducing evidence of the harassed’s speech, 
clothes, and lifestyle which is inclusive of sexual history and past conduct.353 This gives rise to 
the stereotype that women’s true intentions can only be determined from their speech, dress or 
past behaviour.354 
 
Thus, the onus shifts to the harassed due to admission of the above evidence in an attempt to 
show that she was more accepting and inviting of the alleged unwelcome sexual conduct.355 
The harassed is essentially put on trial356 which turns into an evidentiary issue357 and the 
consequence is that the focus is no longer on the conduct of the harasser which should be the 
heart of the issue.358 The unwelcome element is considered the “roadblock” for the harassed in 
sexual harassment cases359 which seem to be linked to the fact that the enquiry regarding the 
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unwelcome element is never based on whether the conduct of a sexual nature was unwelcome; 
rather the courts critically analyse the harassed’s conduct for any piece of evidence to 
demonstrate that the conduct of the harasser was welcomed.360  
 
According to Joan Weiner (Weiner), in determining whether the conduct was unwelcome, four 
themes or factors ought to be considered.361 Firstly, the harassed must expressly state clearly 
and consistently that the sexual advances were unwelcome, failure of which the harasser may 
be justified in continuing his conduct.362  
 
Secondly, mixed responses which can be associated with friendly behaviours, such as a simple 
lunch date with the harasser or visiting the harasser in hospital can be seen as welcoming or 
inviting of sexual harassment.363 Thirdly, courts have been open to accepting that the harassed’s 
sexual history which is inclusive of consensual sexual workplace relations is relevant in the 
unwelcome enquiry.364 Lastly, participation in office banter and vulgar speech, regardless of 
whether the harassed was simply trying to fit in, is relevant to determine if she welcomed the 
jokes or innuendoes of a sexual nature.365 
 
Thus, the above factors firmly entrench gender bias366 by supporting the false notion that 
women welcome such behaviour.367 It is noteworthy that the specific problems identified above 
are mainly based in American cases. Therefore, the next chapter will assess, through a legal 
comparative study, whether the factors provided in the Meritor case and the factors detected 
by Weiner play a role in South African case law when determining whether the conduct of the 
harasser was unwelcome. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly defined the unwelcome element with reference to US law and the South 
African 1998 and 2005 Codes. Further, the unwelcome element was understood from three 
perspectives which constitute the different tests used for the determination of sexual 
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harassment. Lastly, the problems regarding the unwelcome element, as well as the factors 
detected in American jurisprudence to determine the unwelcome element have been discussed 
which provides a causal link to the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FACTOR CONSIDERATION FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE 
UNWELCOME ELEMENT368 
 
4.1 Introduction  
It was alluded to in the previous chapter that the scholar, Weiner, investigated common themes 
or factors that American courts would often rely upon when establishing the unwelcome 
element. Moreover, in the Meritor case, the US Supreme Court also provided certain factors 
which play a role in the unwelcome enquiry.  
 
Therefore, this chapter will critically analyse South African case law, inclusive of CCMA and 
bargaining council decisions, in order to compare whether the identified factors have been 
considered by courts and the probative value attached to each factor. Furthermore, in this 
chapter, the extent to which an office romance can be considered as a factor in negating the 
unwelcome element will be assessed. 
 
For structural purposes, the four factors provided by Weiner are rephrased into themes as 
follows: express rejection; ambivalent responses; a sexualised work environment and the 
sexual history or past conduct of the harassed. The factors provided in the Meritor case will be 
considered from the aspect of past conduct. 
 
4.2 Express Rejection  
“Why didn’t she just tell him the harasser to stop?” 369 is a well-known criticism that the 
harassed is subjected to when express rejection is not the method used to show that the conduct 
of the harasser was unwelcome.370 As noted by Weiner, one of the factors to negate the 
unwelcome element is that the harassed must express unequivocally to the harasser that the 
sexual advances are unwelcome, failure of which the harasser is permitted to continue. In fact, 
it has been confirmed that one of the initial steps of a presiding officer is to consider the 
response of the harassed to the alleged unwelcome sexual advances.371 Thus, it seems that 
                                                          
368 Note 248 above, 751 - “Although the lack of clear guidance for determining when conduct is unwelcome has 
resulted in inconsistent case law, certain principles have been established for interpreting whether a plaintiff’s 
behavior welcomed the complained-of conduct.”  
369 Note 318 above, 4362.  
370 Ibid.  
371 Note 229 above, 765.   
 49 
 
courts prefer the harassed to respond by vocalising rejection to the harasser to show that the 
behaviour was unwelcome.372  
 
Even though it has been argued that at times the harassed expressed rejection only enhances 
the harassment;373 it is undisputed that expressing disapproval in a direct manner to the harasser 
helps strengthen the case of the harassed. Further, since research has confirmed that males are 
less likely to recognise their behaviour as sexual harassment as compared to women, express 
rejection to such behaviour will ensure that the different perspectives in relation to sexual 
harassment are curbed.374  
 
Moreover, it must be noted that the personality of the harassed results in and/or evokes different 
responses, be it the passive or active route.375 Possibly the most dominant influence in terms of 
whether the victim would expressly reject the advances of the harasser in order to satisfy the 
unwelcome element - is based on the power imbalance between the harasser and the harassed 
in the workplace.376  
 
It is imperative to mention that this “imbalance” is not merely limited to positions of authority 
in the workplace but also aspects such as age differentials, race or culture.377 Further, Bond 
highlights that this “imbalance” can also result from disparity regarding gender.378 Therefore, 
the cases discussed below make it clear that South African courts have in fact acknowledged 
the impact that power imbalances can have on the harassed’s ability to expressly state to the 
harasser that their behaviour is unwelcome. 
 
In the case of Gerber, a quality assurance manager sexually harassed his female subordinates, 
was dismissed and challenged the fairness of his dismissal. The commissioner noted that sexual 
harassment would affect victims differently.379  
 
The commissioner quoted from the case of J v M which held that: 
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“Inferiors who are subjected to sexual harassment by their superiors in the employment 
hierarchy are placed in an invidious position. How should they cope with the situation? It is 
difficult enough for a young girl to deal with advances from a man who is old enough to be her 
father. When she has to do so in an atmosphere where rejection of advances may lead to 
dismissal, lost promotions, inadequate pay rises, etc - what is referred to as an tangible benefits 
in American law - her position in unenviable.  
Fear of the consequences of complaining to higher authority whether the complaint is made by 
the victim or a friend, often compels the victim to suffer in silence.”380 
 
J v M importantly recognises that power imbalances are precisely the reason for the harassed 
choosing to not expressly communicate to the harasser that the conduct is unwelcome, and 
thus, follow the all too common response of suffering in silence. It is clear from Gerber that 
express rejection should not be seen as the only way of the harassed showing to the harasser 
that the conduct is unwelcome. 
 
Four years later, in the case of Taljaard,381 Mr Taljaard (the harasser) was influential in 
securing Ms Paulse’s (the harassed) re-employment.382 The harassed did not specifically reject 
the advances of the harasser which persisted for eight months.383 The unwelcome sexual 
advances took the form of visits to her workplace and telephone calls to the harassed up to four 
times a day, whereby, the harasser would ask the harassed to go on dates with him and made 
comments regarding her underwear.384  
 
The commissioner accepted that the harassed failed to explicitly reject the harasser’s advances, 
however, noted that what would be expected from the harassed in a social setting is not 
necessarily what occurs in a workplace environment.385 Moreover, the commissioner highlights 
that: 
“Inferiors who are subjected to sexual harassment by their superiors in the employment 
hierarchy are placed in an invidious position. In this case Mr Taljaard was her benefactor, the 
person to whom she owed her employment. Furthermore, in a fractured society such as ours, it 
is pertinent to note that Mr Taljaard is a middle-aged white male, well-to-do, educated, a senior 
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manager and seemingly powerful. Ms Paulse, on the other hand, is a young coloured woman, 
of limited means, low education, a menial worker on the lowest rung of the social ladder. It is 
difficult enough for her to deal with his advances, given this huge imbalance of power, which 
is amplified by socially determined discrepancies, not only around gender roles, but also classist 
and racial notions of superiority. When she has to do so in an atmosphere where her slightest 
hint of discontent may perceivably result in her employment prospects being under threat, the 
position is unenviable. It is within this context that her failure to explicitly inform him that his 
conduct is unwanted is made all the more understandable.”386 
 
The above clearly notes that power imbalances are seen through race, gender, class and of 
course positions of authority at work which in casu resulted in the harasser having power, as 
he secured the harassed’s re-employment. Therefore, due to fear of reprisal, the commissioner 
understood the harassed’s failure to express rejection of the harasser. 
 
Further, it is noteworthy that if one considers the 2005 Code, NEDLAC seemed to take 
cognisance of the difficulties of express rejection in the workplace setting, and thus, 
acknowledges that weaker confrontation methods “such as walking away or not responding” 
to the harasser can show unwelcomeness.387  
 
Upon consideration of the above two cases, it is apparent that commissioners have rightfully 
become more sympathetically aware of the fact that even though express rejection is viewed as 
the ideal method of response for the harassed to show that the conduct of the harasser was 
unwelcome; power imbalances in the workplace are rife, and as such it is indeed a 
consequential factor for the harassed resulting in a weaker confrontation method to satisfy the 
unwelcome element. This is now codified within the 2005 Code.  
 
However, the weaker confrontational methods used by the harassed to show that the conduct 
is unwelcome could have the converse effect of being interpreted by the harasser as a mixed or 
ambivalent response which was identified by Weiner in the previous chapter.  
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4.3 Ambivalent Responses 
As noted by Weiner, mixed/ambivalent responses were seen as inviting or welcoming of the 
advances made by the harasser, and thus, did not satisfy the unwelcome element. According to 
The South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary, the word “ambivalence” means “coexistence of 
opposing feelings.”  
 
It was stated above that the harassed may respond differently in order to show that the advances 
were unwelcome. Further, it was alluded to in the previous chapter that courts are inconsistent 
as to whose perspective the conduct should be considered unwelcome from. Thus, the problem 
arises where the harassed through certain actions, such as being flattered or entertaining the 
harasser, displays uncertainty to the harasser as to whether the sexual conduct is welcomed. A 
comparison of case law, whereby, ambivalent responses were either considered an important 
aspect regarding the unwelcome element or disregarded will be analysed below. 
 
The case of SABC Ltd v Grogan NO & another 388 involved a review by SABC (the company) 
of an arbitration award of a senior sales manager who was charged with multiples counts of 
misconduct.389 The most serious charge was that of sexual harassment of two female 
subordinates.390 The arbitrator found him guilty of sexual harassment of one of his subordinates 
which culminated in two incidents of physical contact in the harasser’s car namely gripping 
her thigh and, attempting to kiss her on the mouth.391 The sanction imposed was a final warning 
with directions to undergo counselling.392 
 
Under review to the Labour Court (LC), the company did not dispute the finding of the 
arbitrator that the harassed was guilty of sexual harassment; but rather the sanction imposed.393 
The LC specifically made mention of the arbitrator’s findings that the harassed went willingly 
into the car of the harasser without justification or reason.394 The LC noted that:  
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“While the complainant’s willingness to be in the employee’s company when she had no need 
to be does not excuse his conduct, it may well have been interpreted by him as a sign that his 
attentions were not as unwelcome as she later made out.”395 
 
The above is significant, as it indicates the causal connection between ambivalent responses 
and the unwelcome element. Thus, it becomes clear that since ambivalent responses could 
result in uncertainty from the perspective of the harasser, as to whether his conduct is 
welcomed, it was seen as a mitigating factor in casu when imposing a sanction for sexual 
harassment and he was given a final warning as opposed to dismissal.396 
 
The sanction also correlates with the company’s policy on sexual harassment, which the 
arbitrator considered in imposing an appropriate sanction.397 The policy notes that victims must 
quickly and unequivocally disapprove the advances of the harasser.398 The LC upheld the 
sanction awarded by the arbitrator, as it was rationally connected to the facts.399  
 
In Gaga v Anglo Platinum Ltd & others,400 the harasser was a senior human resources 
manager.401 He appealed to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) against the judgment of the LC 
who set aside the award of the CCMA and found that the harasser’s dismissal was substantively 
fair.402  
 
He was charged with sexually harassing his personal assistant over a period of two years when 
he made innuendos and comments suggesting that he and the harassed should have sexual 
intercourse.403 The harassed decided to resign alleging that she wanted to move to Cape Town; 
however, during her exit interview, when questioned by HR whether the harasser made 
advances, she outlined the harassment incidents, and when she read the sexual harassment 
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policy for the first time at the interview she became offended.404 It is common cause that the 
harassed was somewhat ambivalent in her responses to the harasser.405 
 
She further admitted that she respected him professionally and that they had a good relationship 
at work; moreover, she admitted that she would communicate with the harassed on personal 
matters.406 She conceded that her responses may have been viewed as soliciting.407 However, 
it was accepted that the harassed did indicate unequivocally that his conduct was not 
welcomed.408 
 
It was argued that the ambivalent responses of the harassed did not satisfy the requirements 
that the advances were unwelcome or that she was offended, and thus, did not amount to sexual 
harassment.409 The CCMA noted that their good working relationship described by the harassed 
and the high regard in which she held harasser only strengthened that she was not offended and 
welcomed the attention.410 
 
However, on appeal to the LAC it became apparent that the power imbalance between superiors 
and subordinates, in terms of ambivalent responses, needs to be considered: 
“The fact that the subordinate may present as ambivalent, or even momentarily be flattered by 
the attention, is no excuse; particularly where at some stage in an ongoing situation she signals 
her discomfort.”411 
 
Thus, the LAC upheld that dismissal was the appropriate sanction.412 The court sought to send 
out a message to superiors who are placed in positions of authority that sexually harassing their 
subordinates only diminishes their high authority with which the employer entrusted them; 
dismissal is, therefore, justified on the basis that the level of trust between the superior and the 
employer has disintegrated.413 
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The Grogan case differs from the Gaga case. The former considers ambivalent responses of 
the harassed as a mitigating factor in the imposition of a sanction due to fault being a 
requirement on the part of the harasser.414 The Gaga case, however, particularly in the 
circumstance of a superior and subordinate imbalance, does not view ambiguity in relation to 
whose perspective the conduct is viewed as unwelcome from as a consideration for sanction 
purposes.  
 
On the basis of precedent, Gaga holds more weight, as it is a LAC decision, whereas, the 
Grogan case is an LC decision. In addition, Gaga is also a more recent case. Moreover, Gaga 
corroborates with the above factor namely express rejection, as it highlights the importance of 
power imbalances which could result in fear of reprisal on the part of the harassed which 
renders ambivalent responses. Even though it would seem that Gaga, for reasons listed above, 
should be followed, it is noteworthy that each case is determined on a case by case basis.415  
 
On the other hand, one should take heed of the fact that where sexual harassment is dealt with 
as a misconduct, the importance of fault on the part of the harasser is paramount. Thus, it is 
submitted that the Grogan case should still be considered in the imposition of an appropriate 
sanction for the harasser in cases where the harassed gave ambivalent responses. The Gaga 
case is important, as it notes that the actual determination of the unwelcome element should 
not be dependent on the ambivalent responses. Therefore, both cases show the distinct enquiries 
between the determination of the unwelcome element and the determination of an appropriate 
sanction.  
 
It is noteworthy that the factors of express rejection and ambivalent responses could overlap in 
that the harassed may give mixed responses to the harasser to avoid express rejection of the 
harasser’s sexual advances. Based on case precedent, highlighted from the above factors, it can 
be concluded that South African courts do not place much emphasis on these factors as a means 
of negating the unwelcome element as opposed to Weiner’s investigation which notes that 
American courts did. Therefore, it is necessary to consider Weiner’s third factor, namely a 
sexualised work environment. 
 
                                                          
414 See Note 4 above, 444. 
415 Note 400 above, 346G.  
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4.4 A Sexualised Work Environment 
As noted by Weiner, participation in office banter of a sexual nature and vulgar speech by the 
harassed are necessary to establish whether he or she welcomed the sexual harassment, 
especially when the harassment is verbal. For ease of reference, office banter and vulgar speech 
have collectively been described as a sexualised work environment. The word “banter”, 
according to the South Africa Pocket Oxford Dictionary, refers to “good-humoured teasing.” 
The Dictionary provides the meaning of “vulgar” as “coarse; indecent; tasteless.”  
 
This factor will closely correlate to the factor of past conduct. The cases discussed below will 
indicate how a workplace covered by office banter consisting of sexual remarks and ribald 
language becomes necessary in the establishment of the unwelcome element.  
 
In Solidarity on behalf of Van Rensburg and Rustenburg Base Metal Refineries (Pty) Ltd,416 
Mr van Rensburg was charged with “sexual harassment, abusive language and assault,” which 
resulted in an arbitration.417  
 
The harasser was not found guilty of sexual harassment by the initial chairperson; rather guilty 
of abusive language which comprised of “off-colour and suggestive statements with overt 
sexual connotations...”418 The main reason advanced for not finding the harasser guilty was the 
culture of ribald language in the workplace which was corroborated by a colleague who 
testified that the harassed participated, and further, that no one was particularly offended.419 
 
One of the main arguments put forward by the company for the new chairperson at the private 
arbitration was that the charges of sexual harassment and abusive language align with each 
other, and thus, the harasser cannot be guilty of one without the other.420  
 
The private arbitrator found this argument to be “fallacious” and held that: 
“The wealth of evidence before the disciplinary chairman, that there was a culture of ribald 
conversation with sexual connotations, which was at least to some extent mutual, renders it 
                                                          
416Solidarity on behalf of Van Rensburg and Rustenburg Base Metal Refineries (Pty) Ltd (2007) 28 ILJ 2888 
(ARB). Hereinafter referred to as the Van Rensburg case (arbitration).  
417 Ibid 2891D. 
418 Ibid 2897B. 
419 Ibid 2897C-E. 
420 Ibid 2897J.  
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difficult to conclude on the evidence before the disciplinary chairman, that Mr van Rensburg’s 
utterances were to his knowledge unwanted…”421 
 
This shows that the enquiry to determine whether the conduct of the harasser was unwelcome 
may be negated where there is a sexualised work environment. In casu, it seems that the 
sexualised environment had become a typical occurrence in the workplace, that the private 
chairperson recognised that the harasser possibly viewed this as a norm, and as such did not 
fully comprehend that his advances of a sexual nature were unwelcome. This was further 
confirmed when the arbitrator held that the type of humour which is considered acceptable in 
a particular job setting, such as a workshop, may not be viewed as acceptable in another 
workplace such as the monastery.422 The arbitrator noted that:  
“An employee who believes that a ribald and even a suggestive brand of humour is acceptable, 
because it is between consenting adults, may reasonably have misjudged the position. It is then 
incumbent on the employee who is offended by this conduct to make it known and if it persists, 
to lay a grievance or take some other appropriate action.”423  
 
Thus, it would appear in a sexualised work environment, the conduct of the harasser is 
presumed to be welcomed, and the harassed must overturn this by indicating that it was 
unwelcome. It is submitted that this is problematic which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Finally, the private arbitrator notes that the charge of abusive language for failure to maintain 
proper etiquette does not equate to the charge of sexual harassment in these circumstances.424 
Thus, the private arbitrator found that the findings of not guilty for sexual harassment by the 
initial arbitrator and the sanction of a final warning was justifiable.425 It is noteworthy that the 
factor of a sexualised work environment, unlike the Grogan case above, played a role for the 
determination of the unwelcome element itself not only for the imposition of an appropriate 
sanction.  
 
In Rustenburg Base Metal Refiners (Pty) Ltd v Solidarity & others,426 the LC recognised a 
sexualised work environment as a possible factor for establishing the unwelcome element.  
                                                          
421 Ibid 2898D-E.  
422 Ibid 2898G. 
423 Ibid 2898G-H. 
424 Ibid 2899B-C. 
425 Ibid 2899C-D. 
426 Rustenburg Base Metal Refiners (Pty) Ltd v Solidarity & others (2009) 30 ILJ 378 (LC). 
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In National Union of Metal Workers of SA on behalf of Africa and Market Toyota – A Division 
of Unitrans Automotive (Pty) Ltd,427 the harasser was charged with sexual harassment of a 
junior employee, Ms X (the harassed), which included physical touching, sexual jokes, gestures 
and insults, as well as enquiries into the harassed’s sexual life.428  
 
The union, who represented the harasser, contended that the current case is similar to the Van 
Rensburg case (arbitration) discussed above namely, one involving a culture “of ribald 
language with sexual connotations,”429 and as such the harasser considered his actions as a 
norm in the workplace.430 Thus, the harasser argued that what he said were merely jokes of a 
sexual nature.431 The harassed admitted that while she told sexual jokes, she knew the 
difference between a joke and sexual harassment.432  
 
The arbitrator held that the reliance on the Van Rensburg case (arbitration) does not correlate 
to the case at hand in that it was not a case involving a culture “of ribald language with sexual 
connotations.”433 The reasons advanced by the arbitrator were that the harasser essentially 
bullied the harassed and abused his seniority status and power which was regarded by the 
arbitrator as a dominant aspect of sexual harassment.434 This clearly went further than a 
sexualised work environment case.  
 
The bargaining council acknowledged the fact that where there are power imbalances in the 
workplace, and males hold positions of authority, sexual harassment is commonly experienced 
by female subordinates.435 Therefore, the arbitrator acknowledged that the harassed felt that 
she had to simply accept this culture created by the male environment.436 The arbitrator 
accepted that even if this environment was based on sexual banter, the harassed was the only 
female and the male employees should have curbed their behaviour accordingly.437 Essentially, 
                                                          
427 National Union of Metal Workers of SA on behalf of Africa and Market Toyota – A Division of Unitrans 
Automotive (Pty) Ltd (2009) 30 ILJ 458 (BCA). Hereinafter referred to as the Africa and Market Toyota case.  
428 Ibid 458F and 473E-F. 
429 Ibid 459. See Note 416 above, 2898D-E. 
430 Note 427 above, 467A. 
431 Ibid 460E-F. 
432 Ibid 461B. 
433 Ibid 471G. 
434 Ibid 471H and 472C. 
435 Ibid 472A. 
436 Ibid 472B. 
437 Ibid 470G. 
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the factor of a sexualised work environment was not taken into account for the negation of the 
unwelcome element and ultimately the determination of sexual harassment. 
 
The Africa and Market Toyota case differed from the Van Rensburg case based on the facts, as 
stated above, the former case went beyond mere ribald language and sexual banter but crossed 
the realm of sexual harassment. Further, observations also include the fact that in the Van 
Rensburg case (arbitration) there was a culture of sexualised banter which was considered the 
norm evident from witnesses (namely other female employees) who testified that they were not 
offended.438 This differed from the Africa and Market Toyota case, as no further witnesses 
were called to indicate that the jokes were not perceived in the context of sexual harassment at 
work and unlike the Van Rensburg case (arbitration), Ms X was the only female in the male-
dominated workshop.  
 
Moreover, the main reason why the initial chairperson in Van Rensburg accepted that this case 
did not amount to sexual harassment was that the harassed participated in the sexualised work 
culture and was not offended.439 This differed from the current case, as the arbitrator held that 
Ms X did tell the harasser to not communicate with her in a sexual manner even though she 
may have used foul language.440 Further, Ms X did not initiate or encourage any sexual jokes.441 
 
However, as noted above, the LC accepted the findings of the initial chairperson in the Van 
Rensburg case (arbitration); it would seem that a sexualised work environment may be relevant 
to South African courts to determine if the conduct of the harasser was unwelcome. This 
essentially requires courts to consider the extent to which the harassed participated in the 
sexualised work culture as well as her role in using ribald language. The latter encourages the 
defence for the harasser to shift the onus onto the harassed in order to analyse her conduct and 
whether she was welcoming of such behaviour.442 With that said, another example of shifting 
the onus to the harassed is where the sexual history and past conduct of the harassed are 
scrutinised, which is the fourth and final factor detected by Weiner. 
 
 
                                                          
438 See Note 416 above, 2897D.  
439 Ibid 2897D-E.  
440 Note 427 above, 470H-I. 
441 Ibid 471A-B. 
442 Note 1 above, 109. 
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4.5 The Sexual History or Past Conduct of the Harassed 
As noted by Weiner, the sexual history of the victim may be relevant in the establishment of 
the unwelcome element. The US Supreme court, in Meritor, held that speech and dress of the 
harassed are also relevant for the unwelcome element which will be assessed from the aspect 
of past conduct. According to Basson:  
“A further issue often raised under the heading of unwelcomeness relates to the relevance of 
past conduct by the victim of harassment. It is, for example, relevant in deciding whether a 
hostile working environment existed that the plaintiff herself used foul language, that she 
herself participated in discussions of a sexual nature, or dressed in a provocative way?”443 
 
The term “sexual history” is usually alluded to in rape cases, however, in cases of sexual 
harassment - sexual history refers to an investigation into the harassed’s past sexual conduct or 
behaviour, which may not necessarily involve intimacy with the harasser.444   
 
Society still promotes the stereotype that a woman probably “asked for it” due to her dress or 
that the harassed’s sexual history supports the contention that she is a promiscuous woman, 
and thus, was more welcoming and solicited the conduct of the harasser.445 Thus, the 
acceptance of evidence regarding the harassed’s sexual history, speech, dress and past conduct 
are used to show that the harassed welcomed the harassment and, therefore, negates the 
unwelcome element.  
 
With that said, a distinction is drawn between the admission of evidence regarding the 
harassed’s sexual history to display her as promiscuous, and thus, welcoming of the advances; 
as opposed to her past conduct which has a direct relation to the sexual harassment at hand. 
 
4.5.1 Sexual History of the Harassed  
In Lynne Martin-Hancock v Computer Horizon,446 the Industrial Court sought to admit the 
sexual history of the harassed as evidence, and due to this the court described her as a “worldly, 
streetwise and experienced woman.”447 The interrogation into the sexual history of the harassed 
                                                          
443 Note 4 above, 431. 
444 L Krieger & C Fox ‘Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment Litigation’ (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 115 
and 119. 
445 Ibid 116. 
446Lynne Martin-Hancock v Computer Horizon unreported case no NH 11/2/14268 (October 1994.) Hereinafter 
referred to as the Lynne Martin- Hancock case. See Note 5 above, 218 and footnote 31.  
447 Note 5 above, 220.   
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essentially focused on the conduct of the harassed as opposed to the conduct of the harasser. 
The Industrial Court supported this by characterising the harassed as a promiscuous woman, 
thereby, shifting the onus to show that she would have been more welcoming of the conduct of 
the harasser in an attempt to negate the unwelcome element.  
 
Apart from the fact that the harassed’s previous conduct was under scrutiny as opposed to 
harasser’s conduct which led to the sexual harassment incident, there are further reasons to 
reject the admission of the sexual history of the harassed. Firstly, the sexual history of the 
harassed may have been unknown to the harasser, meaning that from his perspective he would 
have been unaware that she would be more welcoming to his conduct; secondly, her past cannot 
be an insinuation that she would be more accepting and welcoming of current unwelcome 
sexual advances.448 
 
It is noteworthy that the precedent set by the Lynne-Martin Hancock case would not likely be 
followed due to advances made in legislation regarding the admission of evidence, with 
particular regard to section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act.449 This section only allows for 
questioning of past sexual conduct if permitted by the court or if the court acknowledges that 
such questioning is relevant to the issue at hand.450 Even though this evidentiary rule regarding 
character evidence applies to criminal cases, it may be useful in civil cases, and as such, the 
admission of sexual history of the harassed may only be necessary if the harassed had sexual 
relations with the harasser; cognisance should not be placed on other persons outside the sexual 
harassment incident in the determination of the unwelcome element.451  
 
4.5.2 Past Conduct of the Harassed 
Another evidentiary rule that must be recognised is the cautionary rule which has often been 
applied in sexual offences cases. Sexual offences, such as sexual harassment, do not usually 
involve witnesses; therefore, this rule notes that a presiding officer must exercise caution when 
assessing the evidence of a single witness who was the alleged target in casu.452  
 
                                                          
448 Note 253 above, 1581.  
449 51 of 1977. See Note 1 above, 110. 
450 Note 1 above, 110.  
451 Ibid. 
452 Note 5 above, footnote 28. See Note 1 above, 110 and 111.  
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In the Sadulla case,453 the alleged harasser (Sadulla) challenged the fairness of his dismissal 
for the sexual harassment of the harassed (Kruger).454 The alleged sexual harassment incident 
centred around a discussion, however, the actual content and the initiator of the discussion 
covered by sexual connotations and comments were disputed between the parties.455 Upon 
analysis of the evidence, the commissioner sought to apply the cautionary rule noting that even 
though it has been rejected by feminists, if the rule is exercised in a nondiscriminatory and 
nonsexist manner there should be no reason not to apply this rule.456  
 
According to the commissioner, the cautionary rule applied, as there were discrepancies 
regarding the past conduct of the harassed in terms of whether she initiated the discussion.457 
The harassed initially stated that the harasser approached her; however, under cross-
examination, she admitted that she initiated the discussion by calling the harasser over.458 The 
commissioner highlighted that past conduct as to participation and the introduction of 
material/ideas (such as the fact that she was lesbian and watches movies of a sexual nature) 
into discussions are vital considerations in sexual harassment cases.459  
 
The past conduct on the part of the harassed in the discussion which was claimed to be 
unwelcome resulted in the conclusion of the commissioner as follows: 
“The point is that Kruger and Sadulla were both engaged in a conversation which I find took 
place between two willing and consenting adults, and which does not amount to sexual 
aggression, as there was no real aggressor and real victim.”460 
 
The exercise of the cautionary rule by the commissioner did not need to be mentioned and 
applied as firstly, it has been abolished in rape cases and secondly, it feeds into the stereotype 
of women.461 The commissioner could have simply attached less weight to the evidence of the 
harassed due to discrepancies. However, section 60 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
                                                          
453 Note 292 above.   
454 Ibid 1482D. 
455 Ibid 1482H-J. 
456 Ibid 1486G-H. 
457 Ibid 1486I. 
458 Ibid 1486J and 1487A. 
459 Ibid 1487A-C. 
460 Ibid 1488F. 
461 A Bellengere… et al The Law of Evidence In South Africa (2013) 193. 
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Related Matters) Amendment Act462 abolished the cautionary rule.463 It is submitted that labour 
courts should be guided by this Act in sexual harassment cases. 
 
Despite the application of the cautionary rule, the above case is still important, as it indicates 
that past conduct which directly relates to the sexual harassment at hand may be relevant to the 
determination of the unwelcome element.  As noted, past conduct which directly relates to the 
sexual harassment incident, such as participation in the sexual jokes, initiation of new 
conversational trends play a role in the unwelcome element.  
 
However, the degree of past conduct may also be relevant to determine the degree of sexual 
harassment – a court may be unconvinced by an alleged harassed who states that sexual jokes 
were unwelcome yet she herself used ribald language; on the other hand, this does not mean 
she should endure physical unwelcome sexual advances.464  
 
The question of provocative dress, highlighted in Meritor, and addressed under the aspect of 
past conduct, is often raised in order to determine if courts consider the dress code of the 
harassed in determining whether she was welcoming of the conduct of the harasser. The role 
that dress plays in general stems from gender stereotypes in which society depicts that women 
need to dress and speak in a particular reserved manner; failing of which she essentially “asked” 
for the sexual advances. 
 
South African presiding officers have taken heed of the above which was evident in Pick & 
Pay Stores Ltd & An Individual,465 whereby, the court stated: 
“Before leaving this issue, I feel constrained to respond to the point made several times on the 
grievant’s behalf that the complainant’s dress and general demeanour constituted an invitation 
to the kind of conduct visited upon her on 27 April. While such factors may play some part in 
exceptional cases when it comes to assessing the sanction to be imposed on the guilty 
perpetrator in cases of sexual misconduct, they can never, in my view, without more be deemed 
to constitute the type of “incitement” which was clearly hinted at in evidence. The complainant 
herself put it trenchantly in her evidence: “Am I to be condemned for what I wear?”466 
                                                          
462 32 of 2007. 
463 Note 462 above, 193. 
464 Note 214 above, 71 and 72.   
465Pick & Pay Stores Ltd & An Individual 1994 Arb Dig 136.  
466 Note 1 above, 110. See also Note 4 above, 431. 
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As noted in the discussion regarding ambivalent responses, a distinction was drawn between 
the determination of the unwelcome element and the determination of an appropriate sanction. 
The above makes it clear that the dress of the harassed should not be used by the harasser as a 
means to show that the harassed was welcoming/inviting/inciting to the behaviour of the 
harasser. However, it could be seen as a mitigating factor in the determination of an appropriate 
sanction for the harasser. 
 
4.6 Office Romance 
The above four factors provided by Weiner were investigated to establish the relevance that 
South African courts attach to these factors in the determination of the unwelcome element. 
There is a strong correlation between the unwelcome element and an intimate consensual 
relationship at work in that the latter is the biggest justification for the former.467 In other words, 
sex between consenting adults in the workplace should not be a means to sue, especially in 
cases of retaliation where one party to the relationship attempts to sabotage the other.468  
 
Therefore, sexual harassment is the only form of harassment which is not presumed to be 
offensive and unwelcoming due to the possibility of romantic relationships developing in the 
workplace.469  
 
Sanger notes that by definition relationships which are welcomed negate the unwelcome 
element which is crucial for the determination of sexual harassment.470 Therefore, the extent to 
which an office romance is considered in the establishment of whether the conduct of the 
harasser was unwelcome will be analysed by relying on case law below. 
 
In AM / Metso Minerals South Africa (Pty) Ltd,471  Mr AM (the harasser) was dismissed for 
sexually harassing Ms N over a WhatsApp discussion which contained sexual connotations 
and comments.472 The main defence of the harasser was that he was simply “wooing” Ms N in 
order to see if their work relationship could transpire into a romantic relationship.473  
                                                          
467 Note 272 above, 1968. 
468 Ibid 1969. 
469 Note 32 above, 99. 
470 Note 41 above, 79. 
471 AM / Metso Minerals South Africa (Pty) Ltd [2017] 3 BALR 245 (MEIBC). 
472 Ibid 245. 
473 Ibid 246 para 8. 
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Even though the harassed denies that she was welcoming of the advances, the arbitrator held, 
however, that initially, she was flirtatious in her responses.474 Further, her responses were not 
strictly business but were personal, and on the basis of a witness’s evidence, it became clear 
that the harasser and harassed had a warm relationship at the beginning.475 However, the 
arbitrator alluded to the fact that she started ignoring the comments by the harassed, did not 
comment on his sexual requests directly and lied in order to put him off pursuing her.476 The 
bargaining council considered this as an indication that the advances of a sexual nature were 
unwelcome.477 
 
Of particular importance is that the arbitrator acknowledged that despite the harassed’s initial 
responses which might have led the harasser to think that a romantic relationship might occur; 
sexual harassment began the moment that she showed no interest in the advances, and yet the 
harasser continued to persist in his advances.478 This is in line with the 2005 Code which notes 
that even if the harassed previously participated in the sexual advances of the harasser, this did 
not mean that it would always remain welcome.479 Thus, the defence that the harassed was only 
exploring his limits to the possibility of the romantic relationship with the harassed amounted 
to sexual harassment and cannot be a factor to negate the unwelcome element.480  
 
However, in the case of Moboea/AVBOB Mutual Assurance Society,481 an office romance was 
considered to be a negating factor for the unwelcome element.  The district manager, Mr 
Moboea (the harasser), was charged with sexually harassing a female subordinate, Ms Moeleso 
(the harassed)482 and was dismissed. The harasser challenged the fairness of his dismissal 
arguing that he and the harassed were involved in a consensual sexual affair at work.483 
However, even though it was common cause that the parties had sexual intercourse, the 
harassed argued that she only engaged in the latter for purposes of securing her employment, 
                                                          
474 Ibid 258 para 58. 
475 Ibid 258 para 59. 
476 Ibid 259 para 59. 
477 Ibid 260 para 64. 
478 Ibid 260 para 64.  
479 Item 5.2.2 of the 2005 Code. 
480 Note 471 above, para 65. 
481 Moboea/AVBOB Mutual Assurance Society 2010 (5) BALR 524 (CCMA). 
482 Ibid 525 para 8. 
483 Ibid 524 and 535 para 35. 
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as the harasser threatened to terminate her employment if she told anyone about the sexual 
harassment or failed to participate.484  
 
On the basis of evidence, it was accepted by the commissioner that the parties had consensual 
sex because of their romantic affair in the workplace due to the fact the harassed did not indicate 
that she was offended or unwelcoming of the advances and only complained one year later 
after the affair had ended; further, the harasser’s defence was corroborated by his wife evidence 
that there was a romantic relationship between the parties.485  Therefore, since the incidents of 
a sexual nature between the parties were welcomed on the basis of their office romance, sexual 
harassment was not established.486 
 
It is submitted that presiding officers should take the enquiry further in cases involving power 
imbalances, as noted when looking at factors of express rejection and ambivalent responses 
above, to consider if there was true consent to satisfy the unwelcome element. The enquiry into 
power differentials should have been of concern, especially where the alleged harassed testified 
that she only participated because she was threatened by the harasser and was fearful of losing 
her job. 
 
The US Supreme Court in Meritor held that the district court erred in their finding that since 
the harassed voluntarily participated in the sexual intercourse with the harasser that the 
advances were welcomed.487 The district court noted that since the harassed was not forced to 
engage in the conduct, there was no need to inquire into the power imbalance namely, the 
employer-employee relationship or her reliance on the harasser for her employment and that 
she faced threats and was fearful of reprisals.488  
 
However, the US Supreme Court rejected the district court’s finding above and held that “the 
fact that sex-related conduct was “voluntary,” in the sense that the complainant was not forced 
to participate against her will, is not a defense.”489 Thus, participation without force cannot be 
seen as a defence, and more than a mere surface level acceptance is required when considering 
                                                          
484 Ibid 527 para 15 and 535 para 35. 
485 Ibid 524 and 535 para 35. 
486 Ibid 536 para 39-40. 
487 S Estrich ‘Sex at Work’ (1991) 43(4) Stan. L. Rev. 827.  
488 Ibid.  
489 Note 264 above, para 68. 
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whether the conduct of the harasser is unwelcome in cases of a claimed office romance between 
parties of unequal power in the workplace. 
 
The above legal precedent aligns with the argument that in a consensual workplace sexual 
relationship arising out of power imbalances, the employee in a weaker position can never truly 
consent, and thus, welcome the advances.490 Two explanations are provided for the argument, 
firstly, the individual in a weaker position may be engrossed by the power held by the superior, 
and it is for this reason that she consents.491 Secondly, the fear or threat of reprisal by the 
subordinate for failing to consent propels the subordinate to “consent”.492  
 
Therefore, as presiding officers acknowledged the realities of power imbalances when looking 
at factors of express rejection and ambivalent responses, so to should they be mindful that 
office romances between superiors and subordinates may not truly negate the unwelcome 
element and, as such, investigate further. 
 
4.7 Conclusion  
This chapter considered the relevance of the factors that were detected by Weiner, in 
comparison to South African case law. The factors of express rejection and ambivalent 
responses play a minor role in courts in the determination of the unwelcome element. Further, 
the factors of the sexual history and dress of the harassed are not relevant to courts, which 
ensures that gender stereotypes regarding women are not promoted. 
 
On the other hand, the factors which South African courts have considered as a means to negate 
the unwelcome element are a sexualised work environment, past conduct of the harassed and 
an office romance. However, these factors considered by courts are not short of criticism.  
 
Lastly, in cases of an office romance between parties of unequal power, true consent may be 
disguised due to fear or threat of reprisals which presiding officers have not fully accounted 
for. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is to identify problems central to chapter 2, 3 and 4 in order to provide 
recommendations accordingly. Moreover, to bring this study to a close, the findings and 
concluding remarks regarding the unwelcome element will be discussed.  
 
5.2 Identification of Problems and Recommendations for Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 sets out the legal framework addressing sexual harassment. It is undisputed that there 
are a plethora of laws in place due to international instruments, constitutional obligations, as 
well as general laws addressing sexual harassment outside the workplace and labour laws 
designed to combat sexual harassment in the workplace.  
 
However, despite the enactment of laws, sexual harassment continues to be a scourge in the 
South African workforce due to ineffective implementation of these laws. Therefore, the 
recommendations for chapter 2 will focus on the implementation of the laws from three aspects 
firstly, legal awareness for employees, secondly, effective policies and procedures and thirdly, 
assessing how gender stereotypes hinder the implementation of laws.  
 
Firstly, it is recommended that employers ensure that their employees are not only made aware 
of internal policies regarding sexual harassment, but all laws enacted to combat sexual 
harassment, their legal rights, as well as access to courts. This could be initiated by employers 
holding regular educational programmes and training sessions around what conduct amounts 
to sexual harassment and how to handle a sexual harassment incident.493 
 
Moreover, it is recommended that since sexual harassment often occurs due to power 
differentials in age and positions of authority (harassers are often older and occupy a superior 
position to the harassed), sexual harassment awareness should be promoted during the initial 
induction of new employees, as they are easy targets.494  
                                                          
493 K Miranzi The effectiveness of the Code of Good Practice in handling the occurrences of sexual harassment 
in a selected South African Higher Education Institution (unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
2016) 88.  
494 Ibid. 
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, there should be separate training for senior employees 
and managers on issues, such as fear of reprisals that employees in a lower position may face 
which may make it seem that they are more open to their superiors’ sexual advances. These 
training sessions should essentially encourage senior employees and managers to act in a 
professional and ethical manner, as they hold a position of trust.  
 
Secondly, it is recommended that employers implement internal policies in the workplace 
which must be guided by the 2005 Codes of Good which sets out the content of the policy,495 
as well as procedures496 for victims to follow when sexual harassment has occurred. Further, 
issues of confidentiality for the harassed should be included and stressed in the policy to prompt 
reporting.  
 
Moreover, the manner in which a female responds to sexual harassment – which is non-
confrontational, differs from the manner in which men respond who are more inclined to follow 
formal mechanisms. It is recommended that the policies highlight, provide for and promote 
informal procedures that attempt to restore peace and allows the co-functioning between parties 
which is line with the main aim of women’s response choice in not following the formal 
route.497  
 
It is recommended that when developing internal policies regarding sexual harassment, the 
draft team should not only constitute management but also employees who occupy lower 
positions.498 This will ensure that policies are drafted holistically by considering the perspective 
and concerns from different key persons in the workplace.499  
 
Moreover, it is also recommended that copies of these policies are frequently distributed to all 
employees to promote awareness to employees and reinforcement.500 Internal policies should 
                                                          
495 See item 7 of the 2005 Code. 
496 See item 8 of the 2005 Code. 
497 S Riger ‘Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures’ (1991) 46(5) American 
Psychologist 501. 
498 E Mabunda A critical Analysis of the Employers’ Obligations in Combating and Eliminating Sexual 
Harassment at the Workplace or Extension of the Workplace in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2016) 71. 
499 R Collier Combatting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (1995) 83. 
500 Note 493 above, 88. 
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be monitored in order to assess if it is been understood and how it is perceived by employees.501 
Most importantly, with labour laws rapidly changing, monitoring and reviewing of these 
policies should occur to ensure that they are legally compliant.   
 
Thirdly, in analysing the implementation of the laws around sexual harassment, it becomes 
necessary to address the fact that gender stereotypes which result from societal norms and 
assumptions can, from a practical standpoint, act as a barrier to implementation of these laws. 
Notions of patriarchy and male dominance originate from family structures and schools, 
whereby, girls learn and accept boys as superior.502 Therefore, such practices find ways into 
the workplace and perpetuate into harassment and gender violence.503 
 
Thus, before policies are issued, and legal awareness is created, employers should assess the 
important issue of gender stereotypes which are indoctrinated in the mindset of employees and 
seen as a norm. The effect of the latter creates a barrier to proper implementation of laws, as 
employees do not fully accept and appreciate the importance of preventing sexual harassment 
through laws. 
 
Therefore, it is recommended that gender stereotypes in the workplace be curbed by promoting 
inclusivity and employers taking steps to ensure that the workplace is gender neutral. This can 
be achieved by managers ensuring that they address employees and use appropriate language 
regardless of gender.  
 
Moreover, diversity training in the workplace around aspects such as age and gender can be 
useful. It is also recommended that if a work environment is male-dominated, managers should 
use strategies to change this which include simple acts such as physically removing posters 
which depict women as sex objects or handling sexual harassment incidents in a serious manner 
to enable a message to be sent out.504 
 
 
 
                                                          
501 Note 499 above, 89. 
502 N Modiba ‘Managing Gender-Based Violence and Harassment in African Schools to Enable Performance of 
all Genders’ (2018) 7(2) JGIDA 186 and 195. 
503 Ibid 190. 
504 Note 499 above, 96.  
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5.3 Identification of Problems and Recommendations for Chapter 3 
The chapter sought to analyse the test for sexual harassment, whereby, there is a linkage to the 
unwelcome element, which asks from whose perspective the sexual harassment incident should 
be considered. The problem of the test identified from case law is that there seems to be judicial 
inconsistency as to whether a subjective or objective test should be followed. 
 
It is recommended that the compromise test, often referred to as the reasonable victim test, be 
applied by courts as it encompasses both subjective and objective elements which ensure that 
the limitations posed by each test alone are curbed. Moreover, it ensures that the determination 
of sexual harassment is considered holistically from the perspective of the harassed (subjective 
element) and the harasser (by considering encompassing circumstances – such as fault on the 
part of the harasser). Issues of fault, which requires the perspective of the harasser, cannot be 
overlooked where sexual harassment is dealt with as a misconduct.  
 
Despite judicial inconsistencies regarding the test, the most problematic aspect identified in 
this chapter is that in sexual harassment cases the enquiry is never limited to whether the 
conduct of a sexual nature was unwelcome. Instead, courts microscopically analyse the conduct 
of the harassed for evidence to indicate that she welcomed the behaviour of the harassed. This 
essentially detracts from the conduct of the harasser and places the harassed on trial.  
 
To rectify the above, courts should keep the focus on the conduct of the harasser. It is, therefore, 
recommended that the harassed should provide reasons and evidence as to how he knew that 
his conduct was welcomed before courts shift the focus on to the harassed’s conduct for signs 
that she welcomed the behaviour.505 Thus, scholars have suggested that the “welcome” element 
be used as a defence for the harasser as opposed to an element of proof in the harassed’s case.506  
 
Simply put, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the conduct of the harasser was 
unwelcome in sexual harassment cases unless the harasser can contest this. This rebuttable 
presumption would make the unwelcome element difficult to prove for the harasser in order to 
remedy the manipulation of the unwelcome element in sexual harassment cases. 
 
                                                          
505 Note 32 above, 105. See Note 249 above, 634.   
506 Note 265 above, 630.  
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Apart from the fact that the above approach will keep the enquiry on the focus of the harasser 
as opposed to the harassed;507 it also ensures that fault on the part of the harasser, where sexual 
harassment is dealt with as a misconduct, is properly assessed, as the harasser does have a 
defence which should be considered. Further, the rebuttable presumption, whereby, the 
harasser has to show how he knew that the conduct was welcomed should be implemented 
considering the psychological study which demonstrated that men are more inclined to read 
sexual connotations into responses of women.508 
 
5.4 Identification of Problems and Recommendations for Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 brings to life the factors identified in American jurisprudence.  
 
However, the problem with the factor of a sexualised work environment, as a means to negate 
the unwelcome element, is that it results in a presumption that the sexual conduct of the harasser 
was welcomed which places an obligation on the harassed to show otherwise. This, yet again, 
shifts the onus to the responses of the harassed and detracts from the responsibility of the 
harasser to know that such conduct is unacceptable.509 Moreover, it seems that a sexualised 
work environment is often male-dominated.510 Thus, if the conduct is presumed to be 
welcomed, it perpetuates false gendered assumptions and norms that anything of a sexual 
nature can be imposed on a woman until she makes her disapproval known.511  
 
To rectify the above, it is yet again recommended that in all cases of sexual harassment, the 
unwelcome element is considered a rebuttable presumption and the harasser should indicate 
how he knew that it was welcomed. 
 
It was established that past conduct that has a direct relation to the sexual harassment incident 
is relevant in the unwelcome enquiry. The problem which arises, yet again; however, is that 
the behaviour of the harassed is placed under scrutiny.  
 
It has been recommended that when issues of past conduct arise in the unwelcome enquiry, 
more emphasis should be placed on evidence that the harassed initiated interaction or new 
                                                          
507 Note 32 above, 105. 
508 Note 249 above, 635. 
509 Note 7 above, 430.  
510 Note 499 above, 35. 
511 Note 265 above, 630.  
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trends in the conversation and less emphasis should be placed on the fact that the harassed 
participated in it.512 The reason for this flows from studies on women’s responses to sexual 
harassment, discussed in chapter 3 and 4. Therefore, the harassed may merely participate in an 
attempt to fit in and avoid confrontation, for example by humour, in order to cope with the 
harassment.513 
 
Lastly, in considering whether an office romance can negate the unwelcome element, a problem 
identified was whether sexual conduct can truly be welcomed between parties of unequal power 
in an office romance. 
 
It is recommended that presiding officers should not adopt a mere surface level approach by 
accepting that conduct was welcome and should take heed of the Meritor case which highlights 
that mere voluntary participation does not mean the conduct is welcome.  
 
Moreover, it is recommended that employers could develop policies prohibiting workplace 
romances all together, as there seems to be a link between the occurrence of sexual harassment 
and a previous workplace romance.514 However, this could be seen as too extreme and infringe 
certain constitutional rights such as freedom of association.515  
 
It has also been recommended that a consensual workplace relationship agreement is signed by 
both parties.516 The purpose of such is to include provisions that the relationship is voluntary 
and should unwanted conduct occur, the complaint procedures are set out.517 Furthermore, the 
agreement notes that if a problem arises, it is to be resolved internally and not via the legal 
route.518 Clearly, the main purpose is to limit the employer’s vicarious liability and mainly 
benefits the superior against the subordinate alleging sexual harassment merely out of 
retaliation.519 
 
                                                          
512 Note 249 above, 635. 
513 Ibid. 
514 C Pierce & H Aguinis ‘A Framework for Investigating the Link between Workplace Romance and Sexual  
Harassment (2001) 26(2) Group & Organization Management 225.  
515 Section 18 of the Constitution.  
516 A Chen & J Sambur ‘Are Consensual Relationship Agreements a Solution to Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace?’ (1999) 17 Hofstra Labour and Employment Law Journal 166. 
517 Ibid 178. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid 190. 
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Since the above approach is too restrictive, especially regarding the limitation placed on legal 
action, a better approach to this could be an implementation of a “date and tell” policy in the 
workplace.520 Once both parties have disclosed their relationship, the employer should 
undertake to inform and educate them on what constitutes true consent/welcomed behaviour, 
whereby, issues of fear of reprisals and job security are discussed. Therefore, such policy 
requires information of a relationship status for the sole purpose of educating employees of 
true consent. 
 
Complaint procedures for conduct that is unwelcome in the relationship must not require the 
superior to the relationship to be involved. Lastly, the “date and tell” policy should also require 
parties to inform the employer when the relationship has ended in order for effective 
monitoring of the employees to ensure that there is a civil non-hostile work environment 
between them in an attempt to take steps to minimise sexual harassment occurring in the future. 
 
5.5 Conclusion   
The main objective of this dissertation was to critically analyse the unwelcome element in the 
determination of sexual harassment. In doing so, a discussion of the legal framework from an 
international and local enquiry occurred, whereby, it was highlighted that the 
unwelcome/unwanted element is the common denominator across legal definitions in different 
jurisdictions. Therefore, it was apposite to unpack the unwelcome element further, as it proved 
to be the most important element required in the establishment of sexual harassment, yet it is 
difficult to prove in practice.  
 
In an attempt to achieve the overall objective, the unwelcome element was defined by relying 
on US case law. The Henson and Meritor cases defined the unwelcome element by asking 
whether the harassed, by her conduct, indicated that she encouraged or welcomed the advances 
of the harasser. The Meritor case made it clear that factors of speech and dress are relevant to 
the unwelcome enquiry. 
 
From a South African law perspective, the 1998 and 2005 Codes were considered. It becomes 
clear that both Codes attempted to define the unwelcome element. However, the 2005 Code 
sought to deconstruct the unwelcome element further by looking to various methods (both 
                                                          
520 Ibid 186. 
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verbal and non-verbal) that the harassed could use to indicate that the conduct was unwelcome, 
as well as the fact that previous sexual conduct that was once welcomed, does not imply that 
such conduct will be welcomed in the future.  
 
The test for sexual harassment, whereby, the unwelcome element is a prominent feature, was 
analysed in order to provide clarity as to whose perspective should be considered to determine 
if the conduct was unwelcome. It was revealed, from an analysis of case law, that there are 
inconsistencies regarding “perspective” in the test for sexual harassment. Thus, the unwelcome 
element was understood from three perspectives which constitute the different tests used for 
the determination of sexual harassment namely the subjective, objective and compromise test. 
 
However, in defining the unwelcome element – the problems associated with the element were 
revealed in that courts focus on the conduct of the harassed for signals that she welcomed the 
conduct of the harasser. This detracts from the harasser’s unwelcome conduct which should be 
at the heart of the sexual harassment enquiry.  
 
Therefore, due to the problems stated above, this study sought to assess how South African 
courts actually determine whether the conduct of the harasser was unwelcome. This was 
initiated by undertaking a legal comparative study. Therefore, factors identified by Weiner, 
which American courts rely upon to determine the unwelcome enquiry, as well as issues of 
speech and dress, identified in the Meritor case, were contrasted and compared to South 
African cases in an attempt to critically analyse factors considered relevant to the unwelcome 
element.  
 
It was established that the factors of express rejection and ambivalent responses play a minor 
role in the determination of the unwelcome element. The minimum role such factors play 
mainly occurs because presiding officers, rightfully so, acknowledge that power imbalances in 
the workplace result in the harassed’s avoidance of expressly stating to the harasser that the 
sexual advances were unwelcome and, as such, these avoidances could be depicted as 
ambivalent responses. 
 
However, it seems that the factor of a sexualised work environment, whereby, the harassed 
participates or does not take offence to the workplace atmosphere may be viewed as a factor 
which negates the unwelcome element. Whereas, the factor regarding the sexual history of the 
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harassed is no longer viewed as relevant by courts to determine if the conduct of the harasser 
was unwelcome due to legislative advances regarding the admission of character evidence.  
 
On the other hand, past conduct of the harassed which has a direct correlation to the sexual 
harassment incident, such as participating in sexual jokes or initiating new trends in the 
conversation with the harasser, is a factor used to show that the advances were welcomed by 
the harassed. Dress, regardless of how provocative, could not be used as a factor to show that 
the harassed may have been more welcoming of the sexual advances.  
 
Finally, an office romance may be viewed as a factor to indicate that during the alleged incident 
of sexual harassment, the parties were in fact in a consensual relationship, and thus, the alleged 
harassed was welcoming of the sexual advances. However, mere surface level acceptance of 
an office romance as a means to negate the unwelcome element could be problematic due to 
power imbalances, as true consent may be disguised as a result of accepting and welcoming 
the advances out of fear or threat of reprisal.  
 
In summary, factors such as a sexualised work environment, past conduct of the harassed and 
an office romance are used by courts in the unwelcome enquiry as a means to negate the 
unwelcome element. On the one end of the scale, it could be argued that these factors result in 
a balanced approach by providing a defence to the harasser in that liability without fault is not 
attributed to the harasser, especially in cases where the harassed did welcome the conduct of 
the harasser.  
 
Even though the above is not disputed, this study hopes to shed light on the reality in sexual 
harassment cases that acceptance by courts of the identified factors, as negation of the 
unwelcome element, only shifts the enquiry away from the harasser and focuses on the conduct 
of the harassed. These factors promote gender stereotypes, place the harassed on trial and are 
relied upon by the harasser as a means to indicate the conduct was welcomed. Essentially, 
therefore, the unwelcome element is likely to act as a roadblock to the harassed in sexual 
harassment cases.   
 
5.5.1 Contributions of the Study 
There has been an insufficient analysis of the unwelcome element required for the 
establishment of sexual harassment. This is evident from the difficulties of proving this element 
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in practice, as well as the inconsistent application of the test for sexual harassment, whereby, 
the unwelcome element is a prominent feature. This study has added value in this regard by 
fulfilling its main objective of critically and coherently analysing the unwelcome element, with 
particular reference to sexual harassment cases in the workplace. The research explored in this 
study revealed the major problem of the unwelcome element in that the harassed’s conduct 
becomes the centre of the enquiry for clues that she welcomed the behaviour of the harassed. 
This is seen as a key strength in the harasser’s case but a “roadblock” for the harassed which 
makes sexual harassment difficult to establish. The recommendations and guidelines suggested 
in this study above would, with emphasis on the unwelcome element, being considered a 
rebuttable presumption for the harassed, undoubtedly serves as a solution to this problem.  
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